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ABSTRACT
Vann, Carol Ellis. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2012. An Investigation
of the Value Relevance of Accounting Information, IFRS, Institutional Factors, Culture,
and Corporate Governance: International Evidence. Major Professor: Dr. Zabihollah
Rezaee.
The purpose of my dissertation is to investigate whether the use of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial reporting is associated with
incremental changes in the value relevance of accounting information and to explore
whether cross-country institutional factors or corporate governance mechanisms provide
incremental information to explain the firm’s stock price (return). I use a price-based
valuation model, which shows the association between the market value of equity and
accounting earnings (book value), and a returns-based valuation model, which shows the
association between returns and earnings levels (changes). In Chapter 2, I investigate
whether the use of IFRS is associated with the value relevance of accounting information
across sixteen countries using a price (return) sample of 888 (843) firms with 5,180
(4,684) firm-year observations. The results are mixed; in both models, the IFRS dummy
is significantly informative, but the interaction terms are not. Next, I examine whether the
use of IFRS for financial reporting is related to the country’s legal origin, strength of its
judicial system, or secrecy of its culture in Chapter 3 using the same samples. The results
suggest that the use of IFRS can affect the informativeness of accounting information and
that cross-country factors continue to be informative. Chapter 4 investigates whether
firm-level corporate governance mechanisms across fourteen countries provide
incremental information to the value relevance of the firm’s accounting information when
IFRS is used for financial reporting using a price (return) sample of 176 (163) firms with
610 (554) firm-years. The corporate governance measure is insignificant in the price
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model and shows some significance in the return model. Overall, my results confirm
prior research regarding the use of IFRS and provide evidence that cross-country
differences continue to provide incremental information when IFRS are used for financial
reporting. Prior research has examined these factors in different combinations, but, to my
knowledge, a study of incremental association of these factors with the value relevance of
accounting information and the use of IFRS has not been investigated. My dissertation
contributes to the literature in international accounting and offers policy, practical, and
educational implications for convergence with IFRS.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is composed of three papers that investigate the value relevance
of accounting information and the effects of cross-country institutional factors and
corporate governance measures when financial reports are prepared according to
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by examining firms from sixteen
countries. The studies are presented as independent research papers in Chapters 2 through
4, which results in duplication of some of the material. In order to reduce the redundancy
that would occur if the value relevance models and IFRS were discussed in each paper,
Chapter 1 includes an introduction to my three-paper dissertation and a brief overview of
the value relevance models and IFRS. Papers 1, 2, and 3 are presented in Chapters II, III,
and IV, respectively. Finally, Chapter 5 contains a discussion of my conclusions based
the results of all three papers, their contributions to literature, and their limitations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether the use of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with incremental changes in the value
relevance of accounting information and to explore whether cross-country institutional
factors, including the secrecy of the underlying culture, and corporate governance
mechanisms provide incremental information to financial statement users when IFRS are
used for financial reporting. By value relevance, I am referring to how closely the
reported numbers align with the price of the firm’s stock or returns (Brown, He, and
Teitel 2006). Other terms that could be used are the transparency, information content, or
quality of the financial statements (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 2001; Barth, Landsman,
and Lang 2008; Collins, Maydew, and Weiss 1997; Hayn 1995; Lang, Raedy, and
Yetman 2003).
These are important issues to examine because a primary purpose of financial
reporting is to provide information about the firm that is useful to external users of the
financial reports for their investing and credit decisions. As indicated in Statement of
Accounting Concepts No. 8, decisions to invest in or to lend capital to a firm by an
investor or creditor are based on the assumption that they will receive a return on their
investment (Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting
Foundation 2010). When the financial reports are transparent and reflect the underlying
economic condition of the firm, i.e., are more value relevant, the external user will have a
better understanding of the firm’s future prospects of profibility. In other words, more
value relevant financial reporting may enhance the investing and credit decision-making
processes of the external user of the statements (Barth et al. 2008). When the firms are
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domiciled in different countries and are using their respective domestic reporting
standards, a comparison of companies’ financial status can be more difficult, especially
for the naïve investor. It has been suggested by supporters of IFRS that more effective
decisions could be made if the reports are not only transparent, but are also prepared
according to the same accounting standards, such as IFRS as issued by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Additional benefits suggested include the
expectation that financial reporting will be more value relevant when IFRS are used as
compared to financial statements prepared according to domestic standards (Barth et al.
2008).
One stream of research has shown that the quality of financial reporting improved
after the adoption of IFRS (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2010; Barth et al.
2008; Cormier, Demaria, Lapointe-Antunes, and Teller 2009; Hung and Subramanyam
2007). On the other hand, Paananen and Lin (2009) found that earnings quality decreased
in Germany after the mandatory adoption of IFRS by the European Union (EU). Their
results suggest that this decline was more likely to be related to changes that were made
to the standards and not to the increase in first-time adopters. Their conclusion was that
the decision-making process can be more difficult when financial reporting is based on
IFRS. My dissertation contributes to this stream of research regarding changes in the
value relevance of financial reporting when firms report according to international
standards as opposed to domestic standards by showing that, while there have been
benefits related to the transition to IFRS, the effects of cross-country institutional factors
may still be present.
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This is a timely subject to consider because (1) the use of IFRS has increased
globally, (2) the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the IASB are
working on joint projects to converge standards of United States (US) Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IFRS, and (3) the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to make a determination regarding how, or if,
the use of IFRS will be permitted and/or required for US companies in near future. Since
the transition to IFRS can be costly, studies investigating whether there has been an
improvement in the value relevance of financial information provided by companies
required to adopt IFRS by their respective standards’ boards could provide useful
information for external users of the financial statements, standard setters, and academic
researchers.
The research questions that I investigate in my three-paper dissertation are:
Paper 1
RQ1: Does the use of IFRS for financial reporting result in changes in the value
relevance of a firm’s accounting information?
RQ2: If there are changes, how are the incremental changes resulting from the use of
IFRS for financial reporting related to the book value of equity and/or earnings?
Paper 2
RQ1: Do cross-country institutional factors and culture offer incremental valuerelevant information when IFRS are used for financial reporting?
Paper 3
RQ1: Do firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms provide incremental valuerelevant information when IFRS are used for financial reporting?
To explore these issues, my samples include firms from sixteen countries for
Papers 1 and 2 and from fourteen countries for Paper 3. I utilize two models frequently
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used in the value relevance literature: (1) a price-based model, which uses the firm’s
earnings and book value of equity to explain stock price, and (2) a returns-based model,
which explains annual changes in returns by current earnings and the annual change in
earnings (Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski 1993; Ali and Hwang 2000; Barth,
Landsman, Lang, and Williams 2011; Collins et al. 1997; Easton 1998).
In the first paper, presented in Chapter 2, I investigate whether the use of IFRS
impacts the value relevance of accounting information. I consider the significance of the
coefficients for the IFRS dummy and its interactions with book value and earnings
(earnings and change in earnings) to determine whether the use of IFRS is value relevant
in explaining the firm’s stock price (annual return). I use the full sample, which contains
both the domestic standards (DS) and IFRS financial reporting periods, as the primary
price (return) model. To confirm the results of this model, the sample is partitioned into
the DS and IFRS periods and the price (return) model run for each. Contrary to my
expectations, the results are mixed. The results of the price model support the theory that
transitioning to IFRS significantly increases the overall information content of reported
financial statements as compared to when DS are used for financial reporting, but neither
interaction of IFRS with the accounting variables are significant, which suggests that the
incremental contribution of earnings per share (EPS) or book value per share (BVPS) is
not significant to the explanation of stock price.
Consistent with my expectations, however, less weight is placed on book value
per share and more weight is placed on the information contained in earnings per share
after the transition to IFRS reporting. A comparison of the results of the partitioned
samples, the DS and IFRS periods, suggests that reliance on the BVPS figure decreased
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and the reliance on the EPS figure increased when the firm moved from reporting with
DS to IFRS. Although the variables are significant in the individual models, the
difference in their values between accounting standards does not appear to be significant
when both periods are included in the regression, as evidenced by a lack of significance
for the IFRS dummy and its interactions with BVPS and EPS in the full model. The return
model tells a similar story. In this model, the IFRS variable is positive and statistically
significant, which indicates that, overall, the use of IFRS provides useful information to
explain stock returns. The interactions of EPS and the annual dollar change in EPS
(∆EPS) with the IFRS dummy show that there is incremental information provided, but
the positive relationships are not significant.
Chapter 3 presents Paper 2, which investigates whether the value relevance of
accounting information impacted by the use of IFRS is associated with a country’s legal
origin, strength of its judicial system, or the secrecy of the underlying culture. In this
study, I am interested in the incremental associations of earnings and book value
(earnings and change in earnings) related to the use of IFRS, evidenced by the
significance, or lack of significance, of the coefficients on the interaction variables and
the IFRS dummy. As additional support that transitioning from domestic standards to
international standards changed the effects of the cross-country institutional variables, I
am also interested in changes in the significance of the institutional variables that may
have occurred in the IFRS period as compared to the DS period. The results of the price
and return models are mixed. In both models, the legal regime of the country (ORIGIN)
was negative, but it was significant at the 0.04 level in the return model and highly
significant in the price model. I interpret the negative sign on the ORIGIN variable to
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suggest that stock price is lower in countries that have English common law origins than
in civil law countries. In the price model, the LAW variable is negative, but not
significant; the SECRECY variable is negative as well, but significant at the 0.03 level. In
the return model, both variables are also negative. In this model, however, SECRECY is
not significant whereas the LAW variable is significant at the 0.03 level. These mixed
results will be investigated in more depth in Paper 2. The results of the second paper
contribute to existing literature by showing that, while the use of IFRS affects some of
the differences, these factors continue to offer incremental information to cross-country
variations in the value relevance of accounting information.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I present Paper 3, which investigates the relation between
firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms related to financial reporting and the use
of IFRS to prepare the financial statements, as compared to the use of DS, with a subset
of the sample used in Papers 1 and 2. There have been many financial crises
internationally in the last decade, some of which were the result of fraudulent behavior
and some due to poor management of the firm. Both have caused economic losses to
shareholders and creditors as well as the demise of many firms. As a result, there has
been a move by regulators globally to encourage or require firms to develop more
effective corporate governance mechanisms as a way to limit managements’
opportunistic behavior. International research has shown that corporate governance
mechanisms are positively related to the value relevance of accounting information
(Habib & Azim 2008; Nui 2006). In both the price and the return models, the corporate
governance measure is negative, but, contrary to my expectations, not significant in either
of the full sample models. In addition, the interaction between the corporate governance

6

industry index and IFRS is insignificant and only marginally significant in the return
model.
The results of this dissertation add to contemporaneous research that is examining
whether the goal of improving global financial reporting has been achieved by the
requirement to transition of IFRS for financial reporting. This has policy-development
implications for stock exchange regulators and standards setters as they move to
strengthen the financial reporting and enforcement policies in their respective countries.
For external users, empirical results showing the benefits, or lack of benefits, to IFRS
reporting, as compared to DS reporting, could help to make their decision-making
processes more effective. This study adds incremental evidence to the growing stream of
academic international accounting research of the effects of firms moving to reporting
according to international standards from their respective domestic reporting standards.
Future research could include an investigation of the association between the
value relevance of accounting information and the refinement of IFRS over time. It could
also provide evidence as to whether the influences of cross-country factors and culture
are eventually mitigated. A limitation of this study is that many firms transitioned to
IFRS near the end of the sample period. Future studies could extend the sample period
and perhaps find that, over time, financial reporting continued to improve as standards
and audit practices are refined and enforcement strengthened.
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. The next section of this
chapter provides an overview of the value relevance models that I use as the base models
for the three papers and a background of IFRS. Each of the following three chapters will
present a synopsis of their respective study’s, literature review, methodology, sample
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selection, and concluding remarks. Chapter 5 presents my overall conclusions based on
the results of the three studies, along with their contributions and limitations.
OVERVIEW OF MAIN TOPICS
Value Relevance Models
The focus of value relevance research is to examine the association between
equity market values and accounting information, which suggests a test of whether crosssectional variation in share prices is explained by accounting information. Two
approaches that have been modeled in prior research are the price-based and the returnsbased valuation models. The primary difference between the two approaches is that the
goal of studies that investigate price returns or changes is to determine the information
contained in changes in value during a specific time period and the goal of studies that
investigate price levels is to determine the information reflected in firm value (Barth et al.
2001).
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) modeled the relation between the firm’s accounting
data and market value with regard to its financial and operating activities. For financial
activities, but not for operating activities, book value is equal to market value. In Feltham
and Ohlson (1995), they state that, under clean surplus accounting, the assumption is that
market value equals the “book value plus the net present value of expected future
abnormal earnings (which equals accounting earnings minus an interest charge on
opening book value)” (p. 689). The parameters of the linear model represent the
“persistence of abnormal earnings, growth, and accounting conservatism” (p. 689).
Earlier research indicated that models based on book values and earnings could be
viewed as alternative approaches (Barth 1991; Collins and Kothari 1989; Kothari and
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Zimmerman 1995; Shelvin 1991). Later studies, however, suggest that earnings and
accounting information about the firm’s book value are not substitutes, but are
complementary components of equity value. Therefore, based on the findings of Feltham
and Ohlson (1995), Penman (1998), Chang (1999), and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),
the use of a multivariate valuation model instead of a univariate model is recommended
(Lui and Lui 2007; Sami and Zhou 2004).
Easton and Harris (1991) investigated whether current earnings or the change in
earnings, each scaled by price at the beginning of the stock return period, were relevant in
an evaluation of the earnings/return association. Their results suggest that both variables
are relevant to explain returns and confirm that they are complements, not substitutes.
The inclusion of both the levels and changes in earnings, scaled by price at the beginning
of the period, explain significantly more of the cross-sectional variation found in returns
than when either variable is considered alone.
The price-based valuation models in this study are derived from Eq. (1), which is
based on Ohlson (1995), Collins et al. (1997), Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998), Ali
and Hwang (2000), Kang (2003), Lui and Lui (2007), Hung and Subramanyam (2007),
Barth et al. (2011). Collins et al. (1997) did not include Ohlson’s (1995) term to discount
for the earnings because Maydew (1993) found that the explanatory power of the model
was not significantly improved by permitting a cross-firm variation of the discount rates.
PRICEit = α 0 + α 1 BVPSit + α 2 EPSit + εit
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(1)

where:
PRICEit = stock price for firm i at time t, measured six months after the firm’s
fiscal year-end (Barth et al. 2008; and Barth et al. 2011; Lang, Raedy,
and Wilson 2006; Lang et al. 2003);
BVPSit = book value of equity per share at fiscal year-end for firm i at time t;
EPSit = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, for firm i at time;
and
εit = the error term.
In this model, the parameter α 1 will capture the value relevance, or information
content, of the book value of equity and α 2 will capture the value relevance of earnings.
The R² from this regression represents the total explanatory power provided by book
value and earnings for the firm’s market value of equity.
The returns-based models will be based on Eq. (2), which is based on Easton and
Harris (1991), Ali and Hwang (2000), Barth et al. (2011).
RETURN it = α 0 + α 1 EPS it /P it 1 + α 2 ΔEPS it /P it 1 + ε it

(2)

where:
RETURN it = the firm’s annual stock return at time t, measured as the
cumulative percentage change in stock price, beginning nine
months before fiscal year-end and ending three months after fiscal
year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits (Barth et al.
2011);
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EPS it = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, for firm i at
time t;
ΔEPS it = the annual dollar change in net income per share for firm i at time t;
P it 1 = beginning of the year stock price for firm i; and
ε it = the error term for firm i at time t.
Research has provided evidence of firm-specific conditions that can affect the
value relevance of book value and earnings and accounting quality. Barth et al. (2011)
evaluated matching firms on their propensity score using equity market-to-book ratio,
standard deviation of returns, return on assets, leverage, return on equity, and sales
growth, in addition to industry and size. In pooled results, only industry and size were
significant. Based on this finding and other prior research, the following variables will be
used to control for effects on changes in value relevance. Controls for the price model
include SIZE, defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal yearend, to control for size-related differences and as a proxy for risk (Barth et al. 1998; Barth
et al. 2008); an indicator variable, COUNTRY, to control for differences in economic
activity between countries (Barth et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011); and, based on the firm’s
two-digit SIC code industry classification, the indicator variable INDUSTRY will be used
to proxy for differences in accounting choices across industries (Barth et al. 1998; Barth
et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011). I do not include a control for the individual years in the
price model because, during model testing, when the year dummies are added to the
model, their variation inflation factors (VIF) were large, which suggests a challenge with
multicolinearity.
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Controls for the return model include SIZE, COUNTRY, and INDUSTRY, as
previously defined. The return model does include the variable, YEAR, to control for
events related to the different years because the model testing did not reveal high VIF
scores and the R2 test suggested that some of the years offered useful information.
Prior research has also found that positive and negative earnings have different
pricing multiples, therefore, an indicator variable, LOSS, which takes on a value of 1 if
EPS is negative, and zero otherwise, will be included and interacted with EPS and ΔEPS
to allow the coefficients on EPS and ΔEPS to vary for loss firms (Barth et al. 1998; Barth
et al. 2011; Collins et al. 1977; Hahn 1995).
A challenge for this study is that research has shown there may be econometric
concerns when price levels are used in research studies, such as scale issues,
measurement error, heteroscedastiity of the standard errors, and correlated omitted
variables. Barth et al. (2001) indicates that value relevance research has acknowledged
these challenges and has provided remedies, if needed. A more complete discussion of
challenges for each study can be found in their respective chapter.
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
In 1973, professional accounting organizations from ten nations established the
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) with the goal of establishing a
single-set of high-quality, globally-accepted financial accounting standards. The founding
nations were Canada, Australia, France, Japan, Germany, Mexico, the United Kingdom,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United States. The IASC was responsible for issuing
accounting standards, the International Accounting Standards (IAS), over the period of
1973–2001. In March 2001, the IASC was incorporated in the State of Delaware.
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In April 2001, the IASB, which was headquartered in London, England, assumed
the responsibility from the IASC to promulgate financial accounting standards, the
IFRSs. The IASB continues to recognize the IASs issued by the IASC, some in an
amended form (Deloitte IAS Plus 2012).
The website for the IFRS Foundation and the IASB (2012a) describes the
organization as follows:
The IFRS Foundation is an independent, not-for-profit private sector
organisation working in the public interest. Its principal objectives are:
 to develop a single-set of high-quality, understandable,
enforceable and globally accepted international financial
reporting standards (IFRSs) through its standard-setting body,
the IASB;
 to promote the use and rigorous application of these standards;
 to take account of the financial reporting needs of emerging
economies and small and medium-sized entities (SMEs); and
 to bring about convergence of national accounting standards
and IFRSs to high quality solutions (“The organisation” tab) .
Barth et al. (2011) suggests that the goal of increased use of IFRS for financial
reporting globally, which includes the increased synchronization of international
securities market regulations and the development of international auditing standards, is
the development of accounting standards that are similar and interpretations, audits, and
enforcement of the standards that are more consistent. Currently, there are
approximately120 countries that have transitioned to IFRS, either as issued by the IASB
or their national version of IFRS, and more countries are scheduled to adopt or converge
to IFRS in the future.
While the use of IFRS is not permitted at this time for US public companies
registered on US stock exchanges, the development of IFRS is an important issue for
domestic firms as well. The IASB and FASB entered into a Memorandum of
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Understanding (MoU), known as the Norwalk Agreement, in September 2002. This
agreement was to combine their efforts and to begin removing differences between US
GAAP and the international standards. Progress was made toward this end and, in 2007,
the SEC removed the requirement of foreign filers to reconcile their financial statements
to US GAAP on Form 20-F, provided the financial statements were prepared according to
IFRS as issued by the IASB. In 2008, the FASB and IASB updated the MoU to prioritize
their projects, with the intent to complete the major projects still remaining by 2011.
After the financial crisis in 2008, the FASB and IASB responded to the call of The Group
of 20 Leaders (G20) to increase their efforts of completing the convergence of accounting
standards by instituting monthly joint board meetings and to issue updates quarterly on
their progress. In June 2010, the IASB and FASB modified their convergence strategy,
but maintained the target date of June 2011 for its completion (IFRS Foundation and the
IASB 2010; 2012b). A summary of the April 12-14, 2011, joint board meeting of the
IASB (Sir David Tweedie, Chairman) and FASB (Leslie Seidman, Chairman of the
FASB) indicates that the June 2011 target date for completion had been extended to the
end of 2011 due to the complex nature of the remaining issues (Byatt 2011). In
September 2011, Leslie Seidman, the FASB chair, announced that many of the
convergence projects will likely not be completed until 2012 at the earliest (Cohn 2011).
Completed, or nearly completed, standards to date include accounting changes, inventory,
fair value, borrowing costs, business combinations and noncontrolling interest, and stock
based compensation. Additional improvements have been made related to a more
consistent approach to disclosures of derecognition and consolidations, as well as
substantially converging accounting for special purpose entities and securitizations. The
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final converged standards for other comprehensive income and fair value measurement
will be issued shortly. Remaining major projects include revenue recognition, leases,
insurance contracts, investment companies, and accounting for financial instruments
(Byatt 2011).
Although no official determination has been made to date regarding whether the
use of IFRS will be required or permitted, a staff research paper released by the SEC on
May 26, 2011, Work Plan for the Consideration of Incorporating International Financial
Reporting Standards into the Financial Reporting System for U.S. Issuers, suggests the
possibility of establishing the FASB as the US endorsement body for the standards issued
by the IASB and redefining the definition of convergence to be more in line with the
concept of “condorsement” (p. 7), a term used at the American Institute of CPAs®’
(AICPA) National Conference on Current SEC and Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) Developments in December 2010 by Paul Beswick, the SEC
Deputy Chief Accountant. The “condorsement” framework would combine convergence
and endorsement of IFRS into phases. In the convergence phases, current MoU projects
between FASB and the IASB would be completed in Phase I. During Phase II, the FASB
would develop a strategy using due process to merge into US GAAP the current IFRS
projects. In Phase III, remaining IFRSs would be merged into US GAAP by FASB. The
SEC staff paper anticipates Phases II and III to occur over the next five to seven years, at
which point convergence would be complete and the endorsement phase initiated. The
endorsement phase will be ongoing and the FASB’s role would be to evaluate changes to
IFRS that the needs of US stakeholders may require (Lamoreaux 2011).
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CHAPTER 2: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IFRS USE AND THE VALUE
RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS AND BOOK VALUE
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates whether the use of IFRS is associated with the value
relevance of accounting information. After determining whether there is an association in
the overall value relevance of accounting information, I focus on the value relevance of
reported earnings and book value (earnings and change in earnings) associated with the
use of IFRS for financial reporting. With the increasing globalization of business and
investing, the comparison of financial reports can be more difficult if different GAAPs
are being used in the preparation of the reports. This is especially difficult for the naïve
investor because investors must obtain knowledge of the accounting standards used in the
preparation of the financial statements to understand the assertions contained therein.
This understanding is necessary to be able to make any required adjustments to the
accounts in order to compare financial reports that have been prepared according to
different reporting standards. An additional consideration for all external users of the
financial statements is whether the reported information is value relevant because there
are various levels of transparency depending on which GAAP was used to prepare the
statements. Supporters of IFRS posit that, in this environment, it is desirable to have a
single-set of globally-accepted high-quality financial reporting standards that provides
comparable and value-relevant accounting information to the external user of the reports.
As stated on their website, the objective of the IFRS Foundation and the IASB is “To
develop a single-set of high-quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted
financial reporting standards based upon clearly articulated principles” (IFRS Foundation
and the IASB 2011). At this time, however, not all countries have adopted IFRS as issued
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by the IASB. Some countries have developed a national version of IFRS specific to their
country through various methods, such as converging their domestic standards with IFRS
or endorsing IFRS with criteria established relative to that country’s stakeholders.
The proponents of the development of a single-set of high-quality accounting
standards to be used globally posit that it will improve the quality of reported financial
information, facilitate the comparability of financial statements of companies from
different countries, and improve the flow of capital among the markets (Barth et al. 2011;
Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2008). Recent research, however, has provided conflicting
results regarding the whether the adoption of IFRS has been positive. Cormier et al.’s
(2009) results suggest that there was an increase in the value relevance of equity
adjustments required by first-time IFRS adopters in their sample of companies in France
who transitioned from French GAAP to IFRS. They interpreted the results as indicating
that the market perceived the adoption of IFRS to be increasing the quality of financial
reporting.
Armstrong et al. (2010) studied the reaction of stock markets in Europe to 16
events that were associated with the European adoption of IFRS. Their study was focused
on the implications of the convergence of financial reporting standards and changes in the
firms’ information environments related to the adoption of IFRS by the EU. The results
indicate that investors in the European market were expecting net benefits to be
associated with the adoption of IFRS by an increase in information quality, better
enforcement of the financial standards, a decrease in information asymmetry, and
convergence.
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On the other hand, Paananen and Lin (2009) found a decrease in accounting
quality in their study of German firms. They partitioned their sample into three periods,
the IAS period, 2000–2002, the voluntary adoption of IFRS period, 2003–2004, and the
mandatory adoption of IFRS period, 2005–2006. They found that the value relevance of
the book value of equity and earnings in the mandatory IFRS period was lower than in
the IAS or voluntary adoption of IFRS periods. They also investigated two other
measures of accounting quality, timely loss recognition and earnings smoothing, and
found an improvement between the IAS period and the voluntary adoption of IFRS
period, but a decline in accounting quality between the voluntary and mandatory adoption
of IFRS periods. They interpreted the decline in accounting quality to be associated with
the issuance of new IFRSs and revision of the IASs.
In this paper, I investigate whether the value relevance of accounting information
is related to the use of IFRS globally. Specifically, I examine whether earnings, the book
value of equity, or changes in earnings provide incremental information to explain the
firm’s price or returns when IFRS is used for financial reporting. To address these
questions, I obtained a sample of firms from sixteen countries that changed from their
national GAAP to a version of IFRS at some point during the sample period of 2000–
2009. In order to capture the affect that the use of IFRS has on the changes in value
relevance, I add an indicator variable, IFRS, equal to 1 if the firm used IFRS for financial
reporting in that fiscal year, and zero otherwise, to the base models, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2),
described earlier. The results of the price and return models are mixed. The results of the
price model suggest that the use of IFRS is statistically significant and that it adds
information to the explanation of the variation in stock price. As I expected, when IFRS
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is used for financial reporting, the importance of EPS increases and BVPS decreases;
however, neither of the interactions of IFRS with an accounting variable was significant.
In the returns model, IFRS was significant and positive, but neither its interaction with
earnings per share (EPS) nor change in earnings (∆EPS) were significant.
The results of this study are of interest to the users of the financial statements in
that it will enhance their understanding of the information provided by the financial
statements. They are also be of benefit to regulators and standards setters in the
development of accounting standards and securities regulations as they work to improve
the quality of financial reporting internationally. For academics, my results add to the
growing stream of literature on the effects of IFRS and the value relevance of accounting
information.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of prior literature. The third section provides the hypothesis development and is
followed by a discussion of sample selection, variables, and descriptive statistics. Next,
the research design and results are presented, with concluding remarks following in the
last section of this chapter.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency theory suggests that variations in the value relevance of accounting
information may occur because of management’s incentives, the ownership structure of
the firm, or the accounting standards used, among others. For example, in societies that
have more diversity in ownership of the firm and many small owners, the owners will
generally not have access to inside information and must rely on published financial
statements for their information regarding the firm. To these smaller owners, more
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transparent and higher quality financial reports would be very important to their
decisions. In societies where firms are generally owned by fewer, larger owners,
transparent or high-quality reporting would be less important because these owners
would have access to inside information and would not be relying as heavily on the
published financial reports in their decision-making processes (Ali and Hwang 2000;
Berglof 1990; Mueller, Gernon, and Meek 1994). In the international arena, to meet the
needs of a particular business environment, the accounting standards developed in diverse
societies would generally be different (Gray 1988; Licht 2001).
If the external users were only evaluating firms in their home country, they would
understand the reporting function and be able to compare firms. Globalization, however,
has affected the way firms conduct business and the markets they utilize to raise capital.
Where in the past firms may have listed exclusively on the market of their home country,
they now have the option to cross-list on foreign exchanges, in addition to their home
exchange. In addition, firms with subsidiaries in different countries find that their
financial reporting process is more complicated when financial reports are prepared
according to different accounting standards. For the external user, investing and credit
decisions have also become more complex when firms are listed and/or domiciled in
different countries because of the variations in listing and accounting standards from
country to country.
Before the advent of international standards, Alford et al.’s (1993) study
highlights the difficulties of comparing financial statements when domestic GAAPs are
used for financial reporting and when corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure
practices vary. Using a returns model to explain earnings and the change in earnings as
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one of their metrics and US GAAP as a benchmark, the results of their study of firms
from 17 countries show that there were significant differences in the information
contained in accounting earnings, as well as the timeliness of that information. During the
sample period of 1983 through 1990, they found that both informativeness and timeliness
of accounting earnings were higher in France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands compared to US accounting earnings; whereas Germany, Denmark, Italy,
Sweden, and Singapore’s accounting earnings and timeliness were lower than US
accounting earnings. The results of tests for Canada, Belgium, Ireland, Hong Kong,
Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, and Norway were inconclusive.
When capital markets began to expand globally, these differences in accounting
practices were problematic for users of the financial statements and led to the call for a
single-set of high-quality accounting standards. To meet this need, the international
standards were developed and have been implemented in over 120 countries. Current
research is now documenting the initial results of the move to IFRS from domestic
standards and, over time, we will begin to determine whether the goal of having a singleset of accounting standards that will produce more transparent and value relevant
financial reporting has been met.
To date, international research has examined a variety of topics comparing
financial reporting under different accounting regimes, such as the economic
consequences of the use of IFRS (Daske et al. 2008), a comparison of Chinese GAAP to
IASs (Bao & Chow 1999) or German GAAP to IFRS (Hung and Subramanyam 2007),
accounting quality (Barth et al. 2008), and the relation between value relevance and
shareholder protection (Hung 2001). The stream of research that relates to this study is
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investigations of the value relevance of accounting information prepared according to
local GAAP vs. IFRS.
One of the earlier value relevance studies, Bao and Chow (1999), used the unique
setting in China where Chinese regulations required the firms to prepare one set of
financial reports according to Chinese GAAP and another set according to IASs if they
issued B shares to non-domestic investors on Chinese stock exchanges over the period of
1992 to 1996. They were able to evaluate the value relevance of equity valuation between
financial reporting under these two accounting standards to determine which method
produced accounting information more closely aligned with share prices. Their results
suggest that the book value and earnings reported following IASs had more information
content than when the reports were prepared according to Chinese GAAP.
In Europe, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) used a sample of IAS adopters in
Germany during the period of 1998 to 2002 to compare financial reports prepared
according to German GAAP and IAS. For the first year of IAS adoption, firms were
required to restate the prior year’s statements to IAS. This allowed Hung and
Subramanyam (2007) to compare the same firm-years under both regimes. Their results
suggest that net income (book value) has a lesser (greater) valuation role under IAS than
under German GAAP. Their results are consistent with prior research that the informative
roles between book value and net income can be complimentary and may move in
opposite directions when financial reporting transitions to IFRS (Burgstahler and Dichev
1997; Chang 1999; Easton and Harris 1991; Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Lui and Lui 2007;
Penman 1998; and Sami and Zhou 2004).
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Cormier et al. (2009) evaluated the relation between value relevance and firsttime adoption of the IFRS for French companies with regard to optional and mandatory
adjustments required to be recognized in the first year of adoption of IFRS. Their results
suggest that the mandatory equity adjustments of IFRS adoption increased the value of
equity over the values reported under French GAAP, which the authors interpret as an
indication that, in France, the first-time adoption of IFRS was perceived by the market as
a signal that the quality of the financial reporting had increased. The results also showed
that whether new information was disclosed was a determinant of the value-relevance of
the optional adjustment.
Paananen and Lin (2009) evaluated the characteristics of accounting information
of German companies over three periods: the IAS period, 2000–2002, the voluntary IFRS
adoption period, 2003–2004, and the mandatory IFRS adoption period, 2005–2006. They
were interested in whether accounting quality changed over these periods as the existing
accounting standards were revised and new standards issued by the IASB. Their
measures of accounting quality were timely loss recognition, value relevance metrics, and
earnings smoothing. Contrary to what they anticipated, they found that accounting
quality, using their earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition measures, showed
improvement when going from the IAS period to the voluntary IFRS period, but that it
declined when going from the voluntary IFRS period to the mandatory IFRS period. Also
contrary to their expectations, their results indicate that, when compared to the IAS and
the voluntary IFRS periods, the book value of equity and earnings were less value
relevant over the mandatory IFRS period. According to their interpretation of the results,
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the decline in accounting quality was primarily the result of changes in the accounting
standards.
The previous studies listed are focused on the effects of voluntary or mandatory
implementation of international standards in one country. While these studies are
important, they may not be generalizable to financial reporting outcomes related to the
move to IFRS in other countries. Another stream of research more related to this study
investigates the information content of IFRS across countries as well as firms.
Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) included 21 countries in their study of
accounting quality and the use of IASs. They matched IAS firms with firms using nonUS domestic reporting standards to determine which accounting standards had higher
accounting quality. Their results suggest that the financial reports of the IAS firms were
more value relevant compared to the firms using non-US domestic GAAP.
Barth et al. (2011) compared firms in their pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods
from 27 countries to a matched sample of US firms for the sample period of 1992–2009
to assess whether the move to IFRS increased the comparability of the non-US firms’
accounting information with the US firms. Their results suggest that the comparison of
the IFRS firms to US firms exhibited greater value relevance and comparability when
financial reporting was based on IFRS than when domestic standards were used. While
the comparability did improve, however, significant differences between IFRS and US
GAAP remained, especially in code law countries and countries with low enforcement of
the standards.
My dissertation offers incremental information to this growing stream of research
investigating the significance, or lack of significance, of the value relevance of
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accounting information related to the use of IFRS as compared to financial reporting
according to domestic standards across several countries.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
According to agency theory, the level of information asymmetry in financial
reporting inversely affects the quality of earnings attributes. Information asymmetry
occurs because firm insiders have private information that outsiders are unable to access,
which may give the inside trader an unfair advantage over other traders. When the firm is
less transparent, i.e., information asymmetry levels are higher, the outside traders will
demand a higher return for the risk they incur because they are unable to access the
private information. Accordingly, when the level of information asymmetry is high, the
quality of the earnings attributes will be negatively affected.
Accounting research has provided evidence that the level of information
asymmetry is related to the quality of the earnings reported in a firm’s financial
statements, such as earnings predictability, persistence, smoothness, transparency, and
value relevance, and that this information is important to users of the financial statements
(Affleck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti 2002; Biddle, Seow, and Siegel 1995;
Burgstahler, Hail, and Luez 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Francis, LaFond,
Olsson, and Schipper 2004; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2003; Glosten and Harris
1988; Gray 1988; Liu, Nissin, and Thomas 2002).
International research has provided evidence that accounting standards choices
are related to information asymmetry (Lang, Lins, and Maffett 2009 and Leuz 2003) and
to the value relevance of accounting information (Hung 2001; Bao and Chow 1999).
Gray (1988) posits that national accounting standards are developed in a country to fit the
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value system of that society. In societies where shareholder rights are protected, as in
common-law countries, the financial statements will be more transparent and, hence,
more value relevant to the external user of the statement. In societies where shareholder
rights are weak and ownership is more concentrated, as in code-law countries, there is
less demand for transparency in the financial statements and the information will be less
value relevant to the external user (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
1998).
As a result of the variation in the transparency of accounting numbers from
country to country when different national GAAPs are used for financial reporting, the
information content or value relevance of those reported numbers may vary as well. If the
information provided by the financial reports is of low quality, i.e., less value relevant to
the decision, incorrect investing or credit decisions may be made. To lessen the
challenges external users face when comparing financial statements prepared under
different GAAPs, there has been a move to adopt a single-set of high-quality global
accounting standards to be used in the preparation of financial statements. Currently,
approximately 120 countries are using IFRS for financial reporting, either as issued by
the IASB or their national version of IFRS. Given that there are differences in national
GAAP from one country to the next, I posit that moving from their national GAAP to the
adoption and use of IFRS will mitigate some of the differences in transparency and
accounting quality, which will result in a positive change in the value relevance, i.e.,
information content, of accounting information. My first hypothesis, stated in the null
form, is:
H1: There is no association between the value relevance of
accounting information and the use of IFRS for financial reporting.
26

While there may be a change in value relevance related to the use of IFRS, theory
suggests that the individual components of accounting information used to explain stock
price are complimentary and may move in different directions (Burgstahler and Dichev
1997; Chang 1999; Easton and Harris 1991; Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Hung and
Subramanyam 2007; Lui and Lui 2007; Penman 1998; and Sami and Zhou 2004). For
instance, if the external user perceives that the earnings component is compromised by
management’s opportunistic behavior, the value relevance of earnings may decline and
the value relevance of book value of equity increase. Collins et al. (1997) found, in the
US market, an incremental decrease in the value relevance of earnings while the
incremental value relevance of book value of equity increased. They suggest that factors
that contributed to this shift, among others, were an increase in the reporting of negative
earnings and a change in the average size of firms over time. On the other hand, if the
quality of financial reporting is perceived to have improved, the focus may shift to the
earnings component of accounting information from the book value of equity. Since the
international standards are perceived to be high-quality reporting standards, I posit that
there will be incremental changes in the value relevance, i.e., information content, of
earnings (book value) when IFRS is used for financial reporting as compared to when DS
are used. My second and third hypotheses, stated in the null form, are:
H1(a): There is no incremental value relevance for the book value
of equity when IFRS are used for financial reporting.
H1(b): There is no incremental value relevance for earnings in the
period when IFRS are used for financial.
The value relevance of the return model is determined by the earnings and change
in earnings accounting numbers. I posit that both of these components will be important
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to the user of the financial reports because finance and accounting research have shown
that a predictor of future earnings is current and/or past earnings. When financial
statements are less transparent, the reported earnings may not offer value relevant
information regarding the current economic status of the firm or its future prospects of
profitability. Since the transition to international accounting standards from domestic
standards is purported to increase the quality and transparency of the financial reporting
process, I suggest that the information contained in the earnings and change in earnings
amount will positively change the value of these figures to the investor or creditor. The
hypothesis for the return model will be H1, H1(b) and H1(c). The first two have been
defined previously. The fourth hypotheses, addresses the value relevance of the change in
earnings; H1(c), stated in the null, is:
H1(c): There is no incremental value relevance for the change in
earnings in the period when IFRS are used for financial.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample
Data for all the firms in countries that required or permitted the use of IAS and/or
IFRS during the sample period are downloaded from Compustat Global. Financial and
price data for the firms are obtained from Compustat Global and the accounting standards
classifications are obtained from Worldscope. This beginning sample consists of a total
of 81,793 firm year observations. The following firm years are eliminated: (1) country of
incorporation is different than country of domicile, 8,692 firm years; (2) the LAW or
SECRECY data is not available for the country, 2,538 firm years; (3) initial required data
missing on Compustat Global, 5,513 firm years; (4) data missing when Compustat
financial data is merged with Worldscope accounting standards data and Compustat
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Global price data, 19,180 firm years; and (5) non-industrial firms, 32,962. The initial
sample used for the selection of the price and return models contains 12,908 firm year
observations from the two-digit SIC code industrial classifications of 20–39 and 50–59.
The final sample of countries that transitioned to IFRS during the sample period of 2000–
2009 used in this study includes Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. A description of the sample selection for the initial,
price, and return models can be found on Table 1. The financial data are winsorized at the
5th and 95th percentiles (Barth et al. 2011) to remove the effect of outliers and is presented
in US dollars (US$).
To obtain the sample for the price model, 7,478 firm years are eliminated from the
initial sample to balance the number of firm years reporting according to DS with the
number of firm years reporting according to IFRS or because financial data is missing.
An additional 250 firm years are eliminated because the firm’s book value is not positive
(Collins et al. 1997; Hung and Subramanyam 2007). The final price model contains 5,180
firm years for 888 firms.
To determine the return model sample, 7,995 firm years are eliminated because
required financial data was missing or to balance the number of firm years reporting
according to DS with the number of firm years reporting according to IFRS. An
additional 229 firm years are eliminated because the firm’s book value of equity is not
positive. The final return model contains 4,684 firm years for 843 firms.
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection for Papers 1 and 2
Panel A: Full Sample
Firm years for firms located in the sixteen countries that transitioned to
IFRS during the sample period of 2000-2009
Less:
Country of incorporation different than country of domicile
LAW and SECRECY data not available for the country
Initial required data missing on Compustat Global
Data missing when Compustat Global financial data was merged with
Worldscope accounting standards data and Compustat Global price
data
Non-Industrial firms [Sample includes SIC codes 20-39 and 50-59]
Firm Year Observations used to select the Price and Return Models
Panel B: Price Model Sample
Full Sample Firm-Year Observations
Less:
Financial data missing and number of firm years using domestic
standards and IFRS, balanced per company
Firm's book value of equity was ≤ 0
Firm Year Observations in the Price Model Sample
Panel C: Return Model Sample
Full Sample Firm-Year Observations
Financial data missing and number of firm years using domestic standards
and IFRS balanced per company
Firm's book value of equity was ≤ 0
Firm Year Observations in the Return Model Sample
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N
81,793
(8,692)
(2,538)
(5,513)
(19,180)
(32,962)
12,908

12,908
(7,470)
(250)
5,180
N
12,908
(7,995)
(229)
4,684

An analysis of the firms and firm years by country and industry for the price
model is shown on Table 2, Panels A and B. Australia and Great Britain have the highest
percentage of sample firms (firm years) at 20.05% (17.22%) and 32.88% (36.18%),
respectively. Germany and Spain have the lowest percentage of sample firms (firm years)
at 0.79% (0.81%) and 0.56% (0.42%), respectively. The firms (firm years) included in
the four industry classifications are: 42.79% (42.97%) for consumer products, SIC codes
20–33; 34.35% (34.11%) for manufacturing, SIC codes 34–39; 8.67% (8.80%) for
wholesale trade, SIC codes 50–41; and 14.19% (14.11%) for retail trade, SIC codes
52–59.
The analysis of the firms and firm years by country and industry for the return
model is shown on Table 3, Panels A and B. Australia and Great Britain have the highest
percentage of sample firms (firm years) at 20.88% (18.36%) and 35.35% (39.62%),
respectively. Germany and Spain have the lowest percentage of sample firms (firm years)
at 0.71% (0.56%) and 0.24% (0.30%), respectively. The firms (firm years) included in
the four industry classifications are: 43.77% (43.00%) for consumer products; 35.57%
(34.16%) for manufacturing; 8.30% (8.45%) for wholesale trade; and 14.35% (14.39%)
for retail trade.
Since my research design includes firms in both the pre- and post-IFRS adoption
periods in the models and a dummy variable to indicate the use of IFRS, I will allow the
pre-IFRS firms to serve as a control for post-IFRS firms, which controls for country and
industry. To control for changes in firm size over time, a proxy for firm size will be
added to the model. An alternative method would be to match my sample firms with a
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TABLE 2
Price Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel A: Countries

Country
Australia
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Ireland
Norway
New Zealand
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Total

IFRS
Version Legal Origin
Local
Common
EU
Code-F
EU
Code-S
EU
Code-S
EU
Code-F
EU
Code-G
EU
Common
EU
Code-F
EU
Common
EU
Code-S
LOCAL
Common
EU
Code-F
IASB
Common
EU
Code-F
EU
Code-S
EU
Code-G

Firms
178
14
29
41
62
7
292
22
14
27
17
16
60
5
93
11
888

Sample
20.02%
1.57%
3.26%
4.61%
7.09%
0.79%
32.85%
2.47%
1.57%
3.04%
1.91%
1.80%
6.75%
0.56%
10.46%
1.24%
100%

Firm
Years
892
72
132
218
368
42
1,874
72
106
178
74
72
386
22
608
64
5,180

% of
Sample
17.22%
1.39%
2.55%
4.21%
7.10%
0.81%
36.18%
1.39%
2.05%
3.44%
1.43%
1.39%
7.45%
0.42%
11.73%
1.24%
100%

Panel B: Industry Classification

Industry
Consumer Products
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Total

Two-Digit SIC
Code
20-33
34-39
50-51
52-59

% of
Firms Sample
380 42.79%
305 34.35%
77
8.67%
126 14.19%
888
100%
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Firm
% of
Years Sample
2,226 42.97%
1,767 34.11%
456
8.80%
731 14.11%
5,180
100%

TABLE 2 (continued)
Price Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel C: Legal Origin
Legal Origin
Common
Civil
TOTAL

Civil
French
German
Scandinavian
TOTAL

Firms
561
327
888

% of
Sample
63.18%
36.82%
100%

Firm
% of
Years Sample
3,332 64.32%
1,848 35.68%
5,184 100%

Firms
119
18
190
327

% of
Sample
13.40%
2.03%
21.40%
36.82%

Firm
% of
Years Sample
606 11.70%
106
2.05%
1,136 21.93%
1,848 35.68%

Panel D: Firm Years - IFRS vs. DS

YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
TOTAL

DS
Firm
Years
137
188
385
592
728
425
89
46
0
0
2,590

IFRS
Firm
Years
0
0
0
5
19
412
729
629
503
293
2,590

Total
Firm
Years
137
188
385
597
747
837
819
676
503
293
5,180

_____________
a
French, German, and Scandinavian Code and English Common classifications were
obtained from Barth et al. (2011) and LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).
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TABLE 3
Return Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications

Panel A: Countries
IFRS
Country
Version Legal Origin
Australia
Local
Common
Belgium
EU
Code-F
Denmark
EU
Code-S
Finland
EU
Code-S
France
EU
Code-F
Germany
EU
Code-G
Great Britain
EU
Common
Greece
EU
Code-F
Ireland
EU
Common
Norway
EU
Code-S
New Zealand
LOCAL
Common
Portugal
EU
Code-F
South Africa
IASB
Common
Spain
EU
Code-F
Sweden
EU
Code-S
Switzerland
EU
Code-G
Total

Firms
176
11
20
36
62
6
298
16
15
25
14
11
49
2
92
10
843

Panel B: Industry Classification
Two-Digit
Industry
SIC Code
Consumer Products
20-33
Manufacturing
34-39
Wholesale Trade
50-51
Retail Trade
52-59
Total
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% of
Sample
20.88%
1.30%
2.37%
4.27%
7.35%
0.71%
35.35%
1.90%
1.78%
2.97%
1.66%
1.30%
5.81%
0.24%
10.91%
1.19%
100%

Firms
369
283
70
121
843

Firm
Years
890
56
72
176
318
26
1,856
48
96
166
64
44
284
14
554
50
4,684

% of
Sample
43.77%
33.57%
8.30%
14.35%
100%

% of
Sample
18.36%
1.20%
1.54%
3.76%
6.79%
0.56%
39.62%
1.02%
2.05%
3.54%
1.37%
0.94%
6.06%
0.30%
11.83%
1.07%
100%

Firm
Years
2,014
1,600
396
674
4,684

% of
Sample
43.00%
34.16%
8.45%
14.39%
100%

TABLE 3 (continued)
Return Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel C: Legal Origin
Legal Origin
Common
Civil
TOTAL

Firms
552
291
843

% of
Sample
65.48%
34.52%
100%

Civila
French
German
Scandinavian
TOTAL

Firms
102
16
173
291

% of
Sample
35.05%
5.50%
59.45%
100%

Firm
Years
3,160
1,524
4,684

% of
Sample
67.46%
32.54%
100%

Firm
Years
480
76
968
1,524

% of
Sample
31.50%
4.99%
63.52%
100%

IFRS
Firm
Years
0
0
0
3
13
385
679
565
449
248
2,342

Total
Firm
Years
105
154
325
552
700
779
763
609
449
248
4,684

Panel D: Firm Years - IFRS vs. DS

YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
TOTAL
____________________

DS
Firm
Years
105
154
325
549
687
394
84
44
0
0
2,342

a

French, German, and Scandinavian Code and English Common classifications were
obtained from Barth et al. (2011) and LaPorta et al. (1997).
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sample of US firms based on size and industry. Both methods have been used in prior
research.
Variable Definitions
A complete listing of the variables in my three-paper dissertation can be
found in Appendix A. The variable of interest in both models is whether the financial
statements are prepared according to DS or according to IFRS. To proxy for the choice of
accounting standards used to prepare the financial statements, I use an indicator variable,
IFRS, that has a value of 1 if the financial statements that year are prepared according to a
version of IFRS as reported by the Worldscope database, and zero otherwise. The
coefficients on IFRS and its interaction terms capture the impact on the value relevance
of accounting information associated with the choice of accounting standards. A
limitation of this study is the fact that the IFRS dummy is a noisy measure. A detailed
investigation into the differences between IFRS used by the sample countries is beyond
the scope of this study and could be included in future projects.
Ohlson (1995) posits that a firm’s equity value is a function of its book value and
earnings. The variables in my price-based model, Eq. (4), are those used by Ali and
Hwang (2000), Kang (2003), Lui and Lui (2007), and Barth et al. (2011), which are based
on Ohlson (1995) and Collins et al. (1997). The dependent variable is the price of
common stock for firm i at time t, PRICEit, measured six months after the end of the
fiscal year. The independent variables are the book value of equity per share for firm i at
time t, BVPSit, which will capture the information content of the firm’s book value, and
earnings per share, before extraordinary items, for firm i at time t, EPSit, which will
capture the information content of the firm’s reported earnings. The other value-relevant
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information of the firm that is orthogonal to book value and earnings will be captured by
the error term, ε.
Easton and Harris (1991) posit that returns can be explained by current earnings
and changes in earnings and that they are complimentary, not substitutes. The returnsbased model (4) is based on Easton and Harris (1991), Ali and Hwang (2000), and Barth
et al. (2011). The dependent variable in the returns-based model is RETURNit, the firm’s
annual stock return at time t, measured as the cumulative percentage change in stock
price beginning nine months before fiscal year-end and ending three months after fiscal
year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits (Barth et al. 2011). The independent
variables are EPSit/Pit-1, measured as earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items,
for firm i at time t, deflated by beginning of year price, and ΔEPSit/P it-1, measured as the
dollar change in earnings per share for firm i at time t, deflated by beginning of year
price.
As described earlier, the controls in both models will be SIZE, INDUSTRY,
COUNTRY, and/or YEAR. The return model will contain two additional controls. To
allow the coefficients of the loss firms to vary (Barth et al. 2011; Hayn 1995), LOSS, an
indicator variable equal to 1 if EPS is negative will be added. A control for financial
leverage, LEV, is added, which will control for the firm’s ability to take advantage of
growth opportunities. All financial variables are in US$ and are winsorized at the 5th and
95th percentiles (Barth et al. 2011). The price and income variables in both models have
been adjusted for subsequent capital changes.
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Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the price and return models are shown on Panel A of
Tables 4 and 5, respectively. All p-values in this study are reported two-tailed unless
specified differently. Panel B of Tables 4 and 5 present the results of test of differences
for the price and return models, respectively. Differences in means tests are conducted for
both models, comparing the DS period with the IFRS period using the paired t-test. The
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is used to test the differences in medians for both
samples.0.008 level for the Bartlett test and 0.0002 for the Levene test. Results of both
tests are used because according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s
(NIST) e-Handbook of Statistical Methods, the Bartlett test performs better if the
distribution is normal, or almost normal, and the Levene test is less sensitive to data that
is not normally distributed (NIST Chapter I.3.5.10).
The variables for the price model all showed significant increases in their means,
medians, and standard deviations in the IFRS period compared to the DS period. These
results indicate that, while the stock price increased significantly in the IFRS period, the
variability of stock prices also shows a significant increase when compared to the DS
period.
The mean (median) of PRICE in the DS period is 8.192 (3.682) compared to the
IFRS period values of 10.661 (4.177). The mean (median) of EPS in the price model
increased from 0.387 (0.159) in the DS period to 0.565 (0.232) in the IFRS period. The
mean (median) of BVPS in the DS period is 4.355 (1.896) compared to the IFRS period
values of 5.179 (2.239). The mean (median) of SIZE in the price model showed
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TABLE 4
Price Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa
Variables
PRICE
EPS
BVPS
SIZE

Mean
9.427
0.476
4.767
19.137

Median
3.925
0.189
2.054
19.010

Std. Dev.
13.550
0.824
7.076
1.989

Maximum
53.155
2.974
28.117
22.983

Minimum
0.127
-0.485
0.069
15.864

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Meanc
Variables
PRICE
BVPS
EPS
SIZE

N
2,590
2,590
2,590
2,590

DS
8.192
4.355
0.387
19.003

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Mediand
IFRS
10.661
5.179
0.565
19.271

DS
3.682
1.896
0.159
18.883
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(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Std. Dev.e
IFRS
4.177
2.39
0.232
19.152

DS
12.116
6.714
0.735
1.932

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.008)

IFRS
14.746
7.399
0.896
2.036

TABLE 4 (continued)
Price Model Statistics
Panel C: Price Model Correlationsf
Variables
PRICE
BVPS
EPS
IFRS

PRICE
1
0.848
0.739
0.045

BVPS
0.819
1
0.647
0.062

EPS
0.835
0.747
1
0.083

IFRS
0.091
0.058
0.108
1

______________
a

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.

b

P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

d

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

e

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower, two-tailed;
correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
Sample Period: 2000–2009
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TABLE 5
Return Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa
Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
LEV
SIZE

Mean
0.144
0.038
0.017
0.506
19.174

Median
0.167
0.061
0.011
0.525
19.048

Std. Dev.
0.403
0.106
0.094
0.186
1.959

Maximum
0.906
0.196
0.277
0.801
22.957

Minimum
-0.684
-0.246
-0.17
0.143
15.953

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Meanc

Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
SIZE
LEV

N
2,342
2,342
2,342
2,342
2,342

DS
0.204
0.042
0.024
19.056
0.497

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Mediand
IFRS
0.084
0.033
0.011
19.291
0.514

DS
0.224
0.065
0.014
18.921
18.921
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(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Std. Dev.e
IFRS
0.101
0.059
0.008
19.198
19.198

DS
0.375
0.11
0.097
1.895
1.895

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)

IFRS
0.42
0.101
0.091
2.014
2.014

TABLE 5 (continued)
Return Model Statistics

Panel C: Return Model Correlationsf
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
IFRS
SIZE
LEV
____________________
a

RETURN
1

EPS/PT-1t-1

∆EPS/PT-1t-1

0.258

0.351
0.325
-0.147
0.075
-0.003

0.280

IFRS
-0.150

SIZE
0.074

LEV
-0.003

1

0.309

-0.039

0.283

0.129

0.447
-0.070
0.182
0.090

1
-0.081
-0.016
-0.005

-0.068
1
0.058
0.049

-0.067
0.060
1
0.231

-0.020
0.045
0.252
1

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.

b

P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

d

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

e

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower,
two-tailed; correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
Sample Period: 2000–2009
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significant increases from 19.003 (18.883) in the DS period to 19.271 (19.152) in the
IFRS period.
The standard deviation of price in the DS (IFRS) period is 12.116 (14.746). The
variability of EPS increased from 0.735 in the DS period to 0.896 in the IFRS period. The
standard deviation of BVPS in the DS (IFRS) period is 6.714 (7.399). The differences in
standard deviation between the two periods are all significant. The variability of SIZE
also increased from 1.932 in the DS period to 2.036 in the IFRS period, significant at the
0.008 level.
The return model descriptive statistics, on the other hand, show that the mean
(median) for the dependent variable, RETURN, experienced a significant decline in the
IFRS period compared to the DS period, 0.084 (0.101) and 0.204 (0.224), respectively.
EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/Pt-1 also show significant declines in their means (medians) in the
IFRS periods. The mean (median) for EPS/Pt-1 in the DS period is 0.042 (0.065)
compared to 0.033 (0.059) in the IFRS period. The mean (median) for EPS/Pt-1 is 0.024
(0.014) in the DS period and 0.011 (0.008) in the IFRS period. Possible factors that
could have contributed to the declines are the financial crisis and the global economic
challenges that followed.
The standard deviations, however, increased for RETURN to 0.420 from 0.375 in
the DS period while the variability for EPS/Pt-1 (∆EPS/Pt-1) declined in the IFRS period
compared to the DS period, 0.101(0.091) and 0.110 (0.097), respectively.
Consistent with the price model, SIZE shows an increase in mean (median) in the
IFRS period compared to the DS period, 19.291 (19.198) and 19.056 (18.921),
respectively. Variability also increased for SIZE, going from 1.895 in the DS period to
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2.014 in the IFRS period. All of the differences in the return model variables are
significant at the 0.001 level or lower except for the standard deviations of EPS/Pt-1 and
SIZE. Their significance levels are 0.002 and 0.003, respectively.
Correlations for the price model are shown on Panel C of Table 4. The Pearson
(Spearman) correlations between PRICE and BVPS and EPS are 0.819 (0.845) and 0.835
(0.739), respectively. The correlation between BVPS and EPS is 0.747 (0.647). PRICE
and IFRS have a correlation of 0.091 (0.045). The correlations between IFRS and BVPS
and EPS are 0.058 and 0.108, respectively. All of the above correlations and signs are
expected and highly significant at the 0.000 level. The control variable, SIZE, is
significantly positively related to these four model variables. All other signs and
correlations of the controls in the price model are as expected.
Correlations for the return model are shown on Panel C of Table 5. The Pearson
(Spearman) correlation between RETURN and EPS/Pt-1 is 0.258 (0.351) and between
RETURN and ∆EPS/Pt-1 is 0.280 (0.325). Both correlations are positive and highly
significant. Correlation between the two regressors, EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/Pt-1 is 0.309
(0.447); also highly significant.
The correlations between IFRS and each of the other three variables, RETURN,
EPS/Pt-1, and ∆EPS/Pt-1, are -0.150 (-0.147), -0.039 (-0.07), and -0.068 (-0.081),
respectively; all negative and highly significant. A possible explanation for this relation
could be the economic challenges experienced globally as a result of the financial crisis
in 2008, which resulted in more negative returns during the IFRS period compared to the
DS period, in addition to the fact that no firms are using domestic standards in the years
2008 and 2009.
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The control variable, SIZE, has highly significant positive relations with the
primary variables, except for its negative association with ∆EPS/Pt-1. Additionally, the
negative relation between SIZE and ∆EPS/Pt-1 is highly significant for the Pearson
correlation, but not significant according to the Spearman correlation.
The control variable, LEV, has a negative and insignificant relation with
RETURN and ∆EPS/Pt-1. On the other hand, LEV’s correlations with EPS/Pt-1, IFRS, and
SIZE are all positive and significant.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
The purpose of a single-set of high-quality global accounting standards is to
provide users of the reported financial statements with value relevant information that is
comparable across countries. To test my hypotheses that there is an association between
the overall value relevance of accounting information and the use IFRS and that earnings,
change in earnings, and book value provides incremental information associated with the
use of IFRS, I estimate both the price-based and return-based value relevance models.
Price Model
The price model, Eq. (3), is based on the models used by Ali and Hwang (2000),
Collins et al. (1997), Kang (2003), Lui and Lui (2007), and Barth et al. (2011).
Information provided by IFRS is captured by the indicator variable, IFRS, which is added
to the basic equation and is also interacted with BVPS and EPS to determine their
incremental contribution to the explanation of price associated with the use of IFRS.
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4BVPSit*IFRSit + α5EPSit*IFRSit
+ α6SIZEit + αbj∑INDUSTRYji + αck∑COUNTRYki + εit
(3)
where:
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PRICEit = stock price, measured six months after the firm’s fiscal year-end, for
firm i at time t;
BVPSit = book value of equity per share at fiscal year-end, for firm i at time t;
EPSit
IFRSit

= earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, for firm i at time t;
= an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the financial statements are
prepared according to a version of IFRS during that year, and zero
otherwise, for firm i at time t;

INDUSTRYji = the two-digit SIC industry classification for firm i, a proxy for
differences in accounting choices across industries;
COUNTRYki = an indicator variable denoting the country of domicile for firm i, a
control for differences in economic activity across countries;
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end for
firm i at time t; and
εit

= the error term for firm i at time t.

Examinations of the price model data based on the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and
the White tests suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity. In addition, the presence of
serial correlation is suggested by the Woolridge test. To counteract the effects of the
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the price model is estimated using estimated
generalized least squares regressions (EGLS) with period SUR weights and White period
corrected error terms in Eviews 7. According to the Eviews User’s Guide II, the Period
SUR “class of covariance structures allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation between the residuals for a given cross-section, but restricts residuals in
different cross-sections to be uncorrelated” (p. 608). The white period correction assumes
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that the cross-section errors are serially correlated and heteroskedastic. The period
weights and correction are chosen because of the differences in variances between the DS
period and the IFRS period, as shown by the Levene and Bartlett tests. I choose this
method of estimation rather than ordinary least squares with White standard error
correction because the parameter estimates are more efficient and the t and F statistics are
calculated correctly.
Value relevance studies generally use the Adj. R2 as a measure of the degree to
which the accounting information explains price. In the price model, the addition of the
IFRS variable to the basic model moves the Adj. R2 from 0.666394 to 0.66704. When the
interactions of book of equity and earnings with IFRS are included, the Adj. R2 increases
to 0.667716. The total difference between the basic model and the model that includes
IFRS and its interactions with book value of equity and earnings is 0.001322. My
interpretation of this increase is that the value relevance of accounting information
increases when firms transition to IFRS from their domestic accounting standards.
The focus in this paper, however, is on the significance of the coefficients on
IFRS and its interaction terms. The coefficients on the IFRS variables, which captures the
difference between domestic reporting and international reporting standards directly
related to the use of IFRS, is used in this study as a measure of the information content,
or value relevance, of accounting information related to the use of IFRS for financial
reporting that explains price, as opposed to the use of DS for financial reporting. As a test
of H1, I focus on this coefficient of the IFRS variable to provide the general change in
information as a result of using IFRS for financial reporting instead of domestic
standards. The individual coefficients on the IFRS interaction terms, BVPS*IFRS and
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EPS*IFRS, capture the incremental impact on the value relevance of book value and
earnings associated with the use of IFRS, tests of H1(a) and H1(b). I interpret a
coefficient greater than zero as an indication that there is an increase in value relevance
or information content, whereas a coefficient less than zero will indicate a decrease in
information content in the IFRS period as compared to the DS period.
Table 6 presents the results of the regression of price on book value per share,
earnings per share, IFRS, interactions with IFRS, and controls for the full sample period
in the first column. The Adj. R2 for the model is 0.745, which indicates that model
explains 74.5 percent of the variation in price. The coefficient on the IFRS variable,
0.284, is positive and highly significant, with a p-value of 0.007, which suggests that
value relevant information increased during the IFRS period as compared to the DS
period. The overall contribution of information by IFRS, obtained by summing the
coefficients on IFRS and its interaction terms, is 0.881. Therefore, my first hypothesis,
H1, that the transition to IFRS reporting from DS reporting would not be significantly
associated with the value relevance of accounting information is rejected.
I am unable to reject the second hypothesis, H1(a), that there would not be significant
incremental changes in the relation between the use of IFRS and the book value of equity.
The coefficient for the interaction between BVE and IFRS, 0.023 is positive, but not
significant, with a p-value of 0.6842. The third hypothesis, H1(b), that there would not be
significant incremental changes in the relation between the use of IFRS and accounting
earnings, is unable to be rejected as well. Although the relationship is positive, it is not
significant. The coefficient on the interaction term between IFRS and EPS is 0.575 and
has a p-value of 0.224.
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TABLE 6
Regressiona of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, and IFRS
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4BVPSit*IFRSit +
α5EPSit*IFRSit + α6SIZEit + αbk∑INDUSTRYji + αck∑COUNTRYki + ε
Variableb
Intercept
BVPS
EPS
IFRS
BVPS*IFRS
EPS*IFRS
SIZE

Full Sample
-23.155 ***
0.646 ***
3.928 ***
0.284 ***
0.023
0.575
1.328 ***

DS Firms
-18.704 ***
0.676 ***
5.195 ***

IFRS Firms
-21.887 ***
0.571 ***
5.428 ***

1.102 ***

1.245 ***

Industry Indicators
Country Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²

None Sig.
Some Sig.
5,180
0.745

None Sig.
Some Sig.
2,590
0.801

None Sig.
Some Sig.
2,590
0.794

_______________
a

Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period SUR weights and White
period correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations.
b

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and in US$..

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively, two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
PRICE = stock price six months after fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in
US$;
BVPS = book value per share at fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in US$;
EPS = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end, adjusted for
capital changes and in US$;
IFRS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards, and zero otherwise;
SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end;
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TABLE 6 (continued)
Regression of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, and IFRS
Variable Definitions:
INDUSTRY = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm’s two-digit SIC code, and
zero otherwise; and
COUNTRY = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm’s country of domicile,
and zero otherwise.

Therefore, the results of the price model suggest that, although there is an increase
in the overall value relevance of financial reporting during the IFRS period as opposed to
the DS period, the incremental changes in the book value of equity and accounting
earnings are not as significant as anticipated.
The second and third columns of Table 6 present the results of price model when
the sample is partitioned into the DS and IFRS periods. Hypothesis H1(a) predicts that
there will not be a significant incremental change in the value relevance of the book value
of equity when IFRS is used for financial reporting. The coefficient on BVPS is 0.676 in
the DS period, but decreases to 0.571 in the IFRS period, which suggests that less
reliance is placed on the book value of equity to explain stock price in the IFRS period
compared to the DS period. In both partitioned models the reliance on book value of
equity is highly significant, p-value of 0.000. The difference related to the use of IFRS
between the periods, however, is not significant, as evidenced by the lack of significance
in the interaction term, BVPS*IFRS in the full sample, p-value of 0.684.
Hypothesis H1(b) posits that there will not be a significant incremental change in
the value relevance of earnings per share. The coefficient on EPS is highly significant in
both periods and goes from 5.195 to 5.428 when comparing the DS period to the IFRS
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period. This change suggests that more information is provided by earnings per share to
explain stock price in the IFRS period than the DS standard period, which is counter to
H1(b), but, like book value per share, the change related to the use of IFRS is not
significant, as evidenced by the lack of significance in the interaction term ESP*IFRS in
the full sample, p-value of 0.224. Thus, the results of the regression with both periods
included are confirmed and H1(a), and H1(b) are not rejected.
I interpret the rejection of H1 to indicate that the transition to IFRS from DS
provides positive changes, as measured by the sum of the coefficients on the IFRS
variable and its interaction terms (0.881), and has increased the informativeness of
accounting information. The inability to reject H1(a) and H1(b), however, may indicate
that the increase in informativeness directly related to accounting earnings and the book
value of equity is not as great as was hoped. A possible reason could be that crosscountry differences in the application of accounting standards are still present.
Return Model
The returns-based model, Eq. (4), based on Easton and Harris (1991), Ali and
Hwang (2000), and Barth et al. (2011), is a second test of the hypotheses:
RETURNit = α0 + α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/P it-1 + α3IFRSit + α4EPSit/P it-1*IFRSit
+ α5ΔEPSit/P it-1*IFRSit + α6EPSit/P it-1*LOSSit + α7ΔEPSit/P it-1*LOSS
+ α8LOSSit + α9 SIZEit + α10 LEVit + αaj∑INDUSTRYji + αbk∑COUNTRYki + εit (4)
where:
RETURNit = the firm’s annual stock return at time t, measured as the cumulative
percentage change in stock price beginning nine months before
fiscal year-end and ending three months after fiscal year end,
adjusted for dividends and stock splits (Barth et al. 2011);
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EPS = basic earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items and
adjusted for capital changes, for firm i at time t;
ΔEPS = the annual dollar change in basic earnings per share for firm i at
time t;
Pit-1 = beginning of the year stock price for firm i;
IFRSit = an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the financial statements are
prepared according to a version of IFRS during that year, and zero
otherwise;
εit = the error term; and
the controls are as previously defined.
The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and the White tests of the return model data reveal
the presence of heteroskedasticity. The Durbin-Watson statistic for this data set does not
indicate a problem with serial correlation; however, the results of the Woolridge test
reject the null of no first-order serial correlation. Therefore, as in the price model
estimation, I use EGLS estimation with period SUR weights and White period correction
to correct for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals using the Eviews
7 statistical software.
In the return model, like the price model, I am primarily interested in the
significance of the IFRS dummy and its interactions with the accounting variables and
my focus is on their coefficients to test H1, H1(b), and H1(c). Table 7 presents the results
of the estimation of the return model, Eq. (4). Results of the full sample rejects the
prediction of H1 that the use of international standards for financial reporting is not
associated with a significant change in the information content of accounting information,
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TABLE 7
Regressiona of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, and IFRS
RETURNit = α0 + α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/P it-1 + α3IFRSit + α4EPSit/P it-1* IFRSit
+ α5ΔEPSit/P it-1*IFRSit + α6EPSit/P it-1*LOSSit + α7ΔEPSit/P it-1*LOSSit
+ α8LOSSit + α9SIZEit + α10LEVit + αbj∑INDUSTRYji + αck∑COUNTRYki
+ αd∑YEARit + εit

Variable
Intercept
EPS/PT-1t-1
∆EPS/PT-1t-1
IFRS
(EPS/PT-1t-1)*IFRS
(∆EPS/PT-1t-1)*IFRS
LOSS
(EPS/PT-1t-1)*LOSS
(∆EPS/PT-1t-1)*LOSS
SIZE
LEV
Industry Indicators
Country Indicators
Year Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²

Pred.
Sign
?
+
+
+
+
+
–
–
–
+
–

Full Sample
-0.409
2.114
0.707
0.060
0.154
0.096
0.038
-2.578
-0.139
0.019
-0.054

***
***
***
***

***
***
**

Mfg. Sig.
Some Sig.
Some Sig.
4,684
0.382

DS Firms

IFRS Firms

-0.198 **
2.067 ***
0.711 ***

-0.530 ***
2.237 ***
0.831 ***

0.041
-2.513 ***
-0.212
0.008 **
-0.0003

0.030
-2.619 ***
-0.122
0.031 ***
-0.111 ***

None Sig.
Some Sig.
Some Sig.
2,342
0.338

Wholesale Sig.
Some Sig.
Some Sig.
2,342
0.430

___________________
a

Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period weights and White
diagonal correction for heteroskedasticity.
b

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and in US$.

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01level, respectively, two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
RETURNit = the annual return for firm i at time t, measured as the cumulative percentage
change in return for the period nine months prior to the end of the fiscal year through three
months after fiscal year-end;
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TABLE 7 (continued)
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, and IFRS
Variable Definitions:
EPS it = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end for firm i at
time t, adjusted for capital changes and the US$;
∆EPS it = the annual dollar change in earnings from time t-1 to t for firm i at time t;
IFRS it = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards for firm i at time t, and zero otherwise;
LOSS it = an indicator variable equal to 1 if EPS are negative for firm i at time t, and zero
otherwise;
SIZE it = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end for firm i at
time t;
LEV it = total liabilities divided by total assets;
INDUSTRYji = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm i’s two-digit SIC code,
and zero otherwise;
COUNTRY ki = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on firm i’s country of domicile, and
zero otherwise;
YEARit = an indicator variable equal to 1 for each sample firm year, and zero otherwise;
and
εit = the error term.

as compared to when domestic standards are used. The coefficient for the IFRS variable
is 0.060 at a significance level of 0.000. This result suggests that, compared to the DS
period, the information contained in the accounting numbers provides more value
relevant information to explain a firm’s stock return when IFRS are used for financial
reporting. This result is consistent with contemporaneous research that shows an
improvement of the value relevance of accounting information when firms transition to
IFRS from their respective domestic standards.
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When financial reporting is less transparent or when reports are prepared in
environments with lesser degrees of shareholder protection or legal remedies, external
users of the statements may place more emphasis on the book value of the company than
on its current earnings. With the goal of improving financial reporting, a transition from
domestic standards to international accounting standards is expected to increase the
incremental information content and value relevance of financial reports. Therefore,
H1(b) predicts that there will be a significant positive change in the incremental
information provided by earnings and H1(c) predicts that there will be a significant
positive change in the incremental information provided by the annual change in
earnings. The interaction between IFRS and EPS is a test of H1(b) and the interaction
between IFRS and ∆EPS is a test of H1(c). Neither hypotheses is supported, as
evidenced by a lack of significance of both interaction variables EPS*IFRS and
ΔEPS*IFRS in the full sample. Coefficients (p-value) for the interactions of EPS*IFRS
and ΔEPS*IFRS are 0.154 (0.177) and 0.096 (0.760), respectively. This result is
confirmed when comparing changes in the coefficients for EPS and ΔEPS between the
DS period and the IFRS period regressions with the interaction variables in the full
sample. The coefficient for EPS changed from 2.067 in the DS period to 2.237 in the
IFRS period, but the change is insignificant, as evidenced by the lack of significance of
the interaction term, EPS*IFRS in the full sample regression, which has a coefficient of
0.154 and a p-value of 0.177. The coefficient on ΔEPS during the DS period was 0.711
and increased to 0.831 in the IFRS period. This resulted in a change in incremental
information of the change in earnings amount, but H(c) is not rejected because of the lack
of significance indicated by a coefficient of 0.096 and p-value of 0.447 in the full sample.
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Overall, the results support the contention that a transition to IFRS provides more
transparent and value relevant information overall, but they do not suggest that the
change in incremental information provided by earnings and the change in earnings when
IFRS is used for financial reporting, as compared to using DS for reporting, is significant
to the explanation of returns by accounting figures.
A possible explanation for the results of both models could be the emerging
evidence by contemporaneous research that not all of the benefits expected by the move
from domestic standards to international standards are being realized. A limitation of this
study is the time period evaluated. A future study could examine the effects of using
IFRS over time. It could be expected that, as the standards are refined, as firms gain more
experience applying the standards, and as enforcement and auditing procedures are
strengthened, the value relevance of accounting information would also increase.
Robustness Checks
Price Model
To confirm the rejection of H1 by the price model, I start with the basic model of
regressing PRICE on BVPS and EPS only. The Adj. R2 from this regression is 0.666394. I
add the IFRS variable and run the regression again. In this regression, IFRS is significant,
with coefficient of 0.514 and a p-value of 0.0004. The model Adj. R2 increases slightly to
0.666704 from the previous 0.666394. In the next step, I add the interactions of BVPS
and EPS with IFRS. While positive, neither interaction term is significant. The coefficient
for BVPS*IFRS is 0.055 at a significance level of 0.3827; the coefficient for EPS*IFRS is
0.048 and the p-value is 0.9303. In addition, the IFRS variable, although no longer highly
significant, it remains significant, with a coefficient of .277 and a p-value of 0.0170. The
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Adj. R2 increased from 0.666704 to 0.667716. I interpret the increase in Adj. R2 as the
IFRS variable and interactions are added to the model to indicate that the transition to
IFRS improved the value relevance of accounting information, which is consistent with
the results of Eq. (4).
As an additional robustness check, I investigate whether the significance of IFRS
is contingent on the control used. Using the last regression as a benchmark, I run model
again, including one control at a time. Untabulated results suggest that when industry
alone is added to the model, the coefficient on IFRS, 0.272, remains significant at the
0.019 level. The coefficient on IFRS, 0.387, increased in significance to a level of 0.0007
when the country dummies are added to the benchmark model. In both regressions, the
coefficients on both interaction terms are not significant. When the control, SIZE, is
added to the benchmark model, however, IFRS is no longer significant, with a coefficient
of 0.160 and a p-value of 0.145; the interaction terms remain insignificant. The results of
this test indicate that the significance of the information provided by the use IFRS for
financial reporting, as compared to reporting according to domestic standards, is sensitive
to the control included in the model. Size of the firm appears to be a deciding factor in
the explanation of price and of the contribution of IFRS reporting. A possible explanation
of this phenomenon could be that larger firms may be more likely to have more value
relevant financial reporting already in place and experience less change in the
informativeness of their financial reporting when they transition to IFRS from its DS.
I do not include the year dummies to the final model because a Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) test revealed challenges with multicolinearity between the year dummies
and the IFRS variable. In an untabulated regression with year dummies added in addition
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to the other controls, IFRS is no longer significant and the sign changes from positive to
negative. I interpret this change to be related to the multicolinearity revealed in the VIF
test.
Next, I run the regression with all of the controls for size, country, and industry
included. In this regression, the coefficient for IFRS, 0.284 is significant at the 0.0073
level; the coefficients 0.223 and 0.574 for interaction terms, BVPS*IFRS and EPS*IFRS,
respectively, remain insignificant at the 0.684 and 0.224 levels. When the all three
controls are added to the model, none of the industry variables are significant and have
p-values ranging from 0.5913–0.6777; SIZE is highly significant with a p-value of 0.000.
As in all of the regressions where the country dummies are added, some are significant
and some are not.
Taken all together, these results suggest that IFRS reporting does offer
improvements in the informativeness of accounting information to explain stock price as
compared to reporting under various domestic standards, but that the benefits realized are
not as significant as the standards setters had hoped they would be, especially when there
are periods of economic distress. In part, the relation between IFRS reporting and the
value relevance of accounting information appears to be moderated by the company size
and the firm’s country of domicile. Industry remained insignificant in all regressions
except when it was the only control added. In that regression, IFRS is significant at a
level of 0.019 while the interaction terms remain insignificant.
Australia and Great Britain together account for 53.4 percent of the price model
sample and could be driving the results. To investigate this possibility, equation (3) is run
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without these two countries included in the sample. The results remain robust if both
countries are eliminated from the sample.
To investigate whether the return model is biased because 57.98 percent of the
firm years are from firms domiciled in Australia and Great Britain, equation (4) is run
without the inclusion of firms from these two countries. Consistent with the price model,
the results remain robust when Australia and Great Britain are not included in the sample.
Value relevance research has provided evidence that scale differences could also
be a challenge, in which case coefficients may be incorrect and standard errors too
conservative (Barth and Kallapur 1996). In addition, scale differences, such as firm size
and their small (large) variable values, may induce heteroskedasticity in the regression
error terms. Remedies they suggest include deflating the regression variables by a scale
proxy, including the scale proxy as an independent variable, and always using White
(1980) standard error estimates. Two proxies for scale suggested that would be correlated
to size are common shares outstanding and total assets. Following Barth et al. (2011), I
use share-weighted market value of the firm, PRICE, as the dependent variable and
share-weighted net income and book value of equity, EPS and BVPS, as independent
variables to reduce the coefficient bias related to scale differences. To correct for scalerelated heteroskedasticity, I used White period standard error correction. As a robustness
check for an induced deflation bias that can occur when using common shares to deflate
the variables, I run a regression adding the reciprocal of common shares outstanding,
1/CSHOI, as an independent variable and the results are robust to the reported results. As
another robustness check, I also estimate the price model with the addition of total assets
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as an independent variable. Again, the original results of the price model continued to be
robust.
Return Model
I investigate the effectiveness of the choice of control on the significance of IFRS
by estimating the basic model of RETURN regressed on EPS, ∆EPS, LOSS, EPS*LOSS,
and ∆EPS*LOSS and then running a second regression with the addition of the IFRS
dummy. The R2 changes from 0.190 in the basic model to 0.201 in the model with the
addition of IFRS. Although significant at a level of 0.000 in this model, the coefficient on
IFRS is negative, indicating that it is negatively related to stock returns. There is a
negative correlation between stock returns and IFRS reporting. A possible explanation for
this could be the fact that the global financial crises occurred primarily in the years that
all firms were reporting according to IFRS standards.
Next, I add the interaction terms, EPS*IFRS and ∆EPS*IFRS. The IFRS dummy
remains significant at the 0.000 level, but neither interaction term is significant, which is
consistent with the results of the full model, except for the negative relation between
stock returns and IFRS. As previously mentioned, a possible explanation could be the
effect of the widespread losses due to the financial crisis in the later part of the sample
period where all reporting was prepared according to the international standards is being
captured by the IFRS variable.
Assigning this regression as a benchmark, I examine whether the significance of
the IFRS dummy and its interaction terms are contingent on the choice of controls. As in
the price model, I run separate regressions, adding a different control each time. When
the country, industry, or size controls are added individually in separate regressions, IFRS
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remains highly significant at the 0.000 level in all three regressions. Although there are
slight variations in the coefficients, t-stats, and p-values, the interaction terms remain
insignificant.
To investigate the negative relation between IFRS reporting and stock returns, I
add the year dummies to the benchmark model. In this model, the coefficient on
EPS*IFRS, 0.195, is significant at the 0.086 level and the coefficient on the IFRS
dummy, 0.075, is positive and highly significant at the 0.000 level, which may suggest
that the effects related to the financial crisis in 2008 are captured by the IFRS dummy
when the control for year is not included.
When the regressions are run with all of the controls for country, industry, and
size are added, IFRS remains negative and highly significant and the interaction variables
remain insignificant. When YEAR is added to the full model with all of the controls, IFRS
is positive and highly significant, but the interaction variables remain insignificant. Taken
together, these results suggest that IFRS is capturing the effects of the financial crisis of
2008 and 2009 when the entire sample is reporting according to international standards. I
have retained the year dummies in this model, excluding 2006, because the VIF test
indicated that the primary challenge with multicolinearity occurs when the year 2006 is
added to the model.
To investigate whether the return model is biased because 57.98 percent of the
firm years are from firms domiciled in Australia and Great Britain, equation (4) is run
without the inclusion of firms from these two countries. Consistent with the price model,
the results remain robust when Australia and Great Britain are not included in the sample.
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Two regressions are run to investigate whether scale effects are influencing the
return model. In the first regression, total assets are added to the full model. In the second
regression, the inverse of Pt-1, which is used to scale earnings per share and change in
earnings per share, is added. The results of adding total assets are robust to there being no
challenges with scale effects in the model. The results of adding the inverse of Pt-1 are
robust to the results of the full model, except for a change in the coefficient on
EPS*IFRS, from 0.096, with a p-value of 0.4471, to 0.182, with a p-value of 0.0969.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of Paper 1 contribute to the international research stream related to the
value relevance of accounting information when international reporting standards are
used to prepare the financial reports by providing evidence of: (1) the significance of the
association between the use IFRS for financial reporting and the value relevance of
accounting information to explain stock price, (2) the significance of the association
between the use IFRS for financial reporting and the value relevance of accounting
information to explain stock return, and (3) that the use of IFRS for financial reporting
adds incremental changes in the information provided by earnings, change in earnings,
and book value of equity. Although I did not find the significant relations that I expected,
these results are consistent with contemporaneous research that is also finding the
benefits of transitioning to IFRS are not as great as anticipated. It may be that differences
in application and enforcement of the standards across countries still exist and are
contributing to the reduced benefit of global standards as suggested in other research.
Perhaps, over time, as the standards are improved; stock exchange regulations, audit
guidelines, and enforcement are standardized; and firms become more familiar with IFRS
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reporting, the increase in value relevance desired will be realized, which could be
empirically investigated by future research.
Studies into the effectiveness of IFRS reporting, as compared to reporting with
domestic standards, may be of interest to standards setters and securities regulators in
their development of accounting standards and listing regulations to confirm the
effectiveness of their programs. These studies also provide information for external users
of the financial statements to help them make informed decisions. A limitation of this
study is that I do not attempt to empirically explain potential determinants of the
differences.
Papers 2 and 3, in Chapters III and IV, respectively, will evaluate the association
between the value relevance of the accounting information when IFRS is used for
financial reporting and cross-country institutional factors, culture, and corporate
governance. Since most firms in this sample have implemented IFRS into their financial
reporting in the last few years of the time period of this study, the results may not reflect
the benefits received as firms become more proficient with their application of the
standards, as the enforcement mechanisms by security regulators, the audit profession,
and the legal environment of the countries are refined and strengthened, and as the
standards themselves are improved. Future research could address these issues.
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CHAPTER 3: POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CROSS-COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL
FACTORS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
INTRODUCTION
Prior research has provided evidence that the different attributes of the earnings
figure are associated with various cross-country institutional factors (Burgstahler et al.
2006; Bushman & Piotroski 2006). Paper 2 of this dissertation investigates the relation
between the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS is used for financial
reporting and three cross-country institutional factors, namely, the legal origin of the
country, the strength of its legal system, and the level of secrecy of the underlying
culture.
When domestic accounting standards are being used for financial reporting, the
level of transparency or information content, i.e. the value relevance of the accounting
information, can vary widely because of cross-country institutional differences. Research,
such as Lang et al. (2009), provides evidence that the level of information asymmetry and
transparency may vary because of cross-country institutional factors. Other studies have
shown that countries have weaker shareholder protection if they are of civil law legal
origin or have weak legal enforcement, as opposed to common law legal origin or
stronger legal enforcement (Ali & Hwang 2000; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Kang
2003; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; LaPorta et al. 1998).
Research has also provided evidence that the secrecy of the underlying culture affects the
accounting system developed in that country and the quality of the accounting numbers
that are reported (Gray 1988; Hope 2003; Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo 2008). An
investigation of whether the effects of cross-country institutional factors are still present
when IFRS is used for financial reporting is important because one of the goals of
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transitioning to IFRS is to provide financial reports that are comparable, regardless of the
firm’s country of domicile.
To address the question, are cross-country institutional factors associated with the
value relevance of accounting information when IFRS is used for financial reporting, I
use the price-based and the returns-based valuation models, Eqs. (3) and (4),
respectively, found in Paper 1. To each model, I add the institutional factors, culture, and
firm-specific control variables as independent variables. I provide evidence that, when
IFRS is used for financial reporting, institutional factors continue to be associated with
the value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings. These results would be of
interest to external users as they compare firms reporting according to IFRS from
different countries and to standards setters and regulators as they continue to refine the
accounting and listing standards.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of prior literature and is followed by the hypothesis development. A discussion of
sample selection, variables, and research design is in the fourth section and the fifth
section presents the results, with concluding remarks following in the last section.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Both domestic and international research has provided evidence of the value
relevance of accounting numbers and the earnings figure, in particular. International
research has shown that variations in institutional factors can explain cross-country
differences in value relevance. The following is an overview of research related to this
study.
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Cross-Country Institutional Factors: Legal Origin and Strength of the Legal System
Two cross-country institutional factors that are investigated in this study are the
legal origin of the country’s current legal regime and the strength of the legal system to
enforce contracts and protect minority shareholders.
Legal origin is often related to the level of shareholder protection, with common
law countries having a higher level of protection for minority shareholders. There have
been several streams of international research evaluating how the legal institutions of a
country impacted its capital markets.
Ali and Hwang (2000) examined data from manufacturing firms domiciled in 16
countries over the period of 1986–1995 with regard to the relation between various
measures of the value relevance of financial accounting data and five country-specific
factors that had been suggested by prior research. Value relevance in Ali and Hwang
(2000) was defined “primarily in terms of explanatory power of accounting variables
(earnings and book value of equity) for security returns, relative to explanatory power for
comparable U.S. firms” (p. 1).
Ali and Hwang’s (2000) third factor, code law versus common law countries,
indicates that value relevance is less important in the code law countries compared to the
common law counties, which is consistent with Mueller et al. (1994). In code law
countries, there is a higher concentration of ownership, which reduces the demand for
transparent financial reporting for external users.
Kang (2003) extended Ali and Hwang (2000) by examining the relation between
the value relevance of accounting information and legal regime. His sample consisted of
firms from Japan, whose financial reports were prepared under Japanese GAAP, and the
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UK, whose financial reports were prepared under UK GAAP. The sample firms had
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded on the US exchange for the period of 1991
through 1999. While Ali and Hwang (2000) provided evidence that five institutional
factors affect the value relevance of the financial reports across countries, Kang (2003)
focused on whether the cross-country differences in the legal regime created differences
in accounting information properties, “the supply effect” (p.121), or whether the ability
of the users of the accounting information to interpret the financial reports varied due to
differences in the legal regime and the level of capital market development, “the demand
effect” (p. 121). Basing his study on the results of LaPorta et al. (1997), which suggests
capital markets are relatively more developed in common law countries than code law
countries, Kang (2003) posited that investors in common law countries may be more
sophisticated users of the financial reports, which, in turn, could result in systematic
differences in the value relevance of the report, even if material differences do not exist
in the accounting information properties. Using the US as a solo capital market setting,
Kang’s (2003) results supported his hypothesis that the legal regime does create
differences in the accounting information properties (the supply effect) and indicate that
the value relevance of accounting information is marginally impacted by the legal
regime.
Hung (2001) suggests that when shareholder protection is weak, the financial
statements’ value relevance is negatively affected by the use of accrual accounting. Their
results are consistent with the assumption that strong shareholder protection is an
important mechanism to improve the efficacy of accrual accounting.
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s (2006) results indicate that securities
regulations matter. For capital markets to develop, the agency conflict arising between
outside investors and controlling shareholders must be regulated. They also found that
stock market development can be predicted by legal origin, with common law countries
benefitting from their emphasis on private litigation and market discipline.
La Porta et al. (1998) evaluated the link between financial markets and the legal
environment. This study of 49 countries provides evidence that cross-country variations
in the character and efficacy of the different financial systems were related to the
country’s legal regulation and the quality of the enforcement of those regulations,
especially with regard to different methods used to protect investors against insider
expropriation of assets. They found that common law countries provided the most
protection for creditors and shareholders, that the French civil law countries provided the
least protection, German civil law had the highest protection of the civil law countries,
and Scandinavian civil law countries fell in between France and Germany. Their results
indicate that ownership of shares was more highly concentrated in countries that had poor
investor protections.
LaPorta et al. (1997), with their sample of 49 countries, examined whether
differences in legal and enforcement quality were related to variations in the debt and
equity markets, which would affect the firm’s ability to raise external capital. LaPorta et
al. (1997) posited that external finance variations were “a function of the origin of their
laws, the quality of legal investor protections, and the quality of law enforcement”
(p. 1132). Their results provided strong substantiation that the country’s legal regime has
significant effects on the breadth and size of capital markets.
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Countries whose legal origins are based on common law, as opposed to civil law,
generally have stronger legal systems for the protection of minority shareholders (La
Porta et al. 1998), which would aid in the enforcement of contracts or deviations from
GAAP. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) posit that the
effectiveness of a country’s legal system to protect both minority shareholders and
creditors from expropriation by majority shareholders and managers helps to explain
cross-country differences in the depth and breadth of their capital markets, the ownership
concentration found in publicly traded firms, the firm’s dividend policies, and how
readily firms can access external financing.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggests that earnings are important avenues in the
US to reduce information asymmetries and to convey information to outside parties.
Burgstahler et al. (2006) posits that, in the international arena, the role of earnings is
determined by a firm’s institutional environment and capital markets. In their study of
public and private companies domiciled in the EU, they examined how differing
institutional factors and capital market pressures influenced management’s incentives in
financial reporting, i.e., the incentive to manage earnings. They discovered that private
firms exhibited more earnings management than public firms. In addition, they provide
evidence that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management, for both
public and private firms.
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examined how financial reporting incentives are
influenced by the political and legal institutions of a country. In particular, they were
interested in whether cross-country institutional variations produce incentives for
conservative financial reporting. The authors posit that a country’s securities laws,
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judicial system, tax regime, and political economy create incentives that may influence
the behavior of management, regulators, and investors, as well as other market
participants. Through a complex interplay of accounting standards, market, legal,
political, and regulatory pressures, these incentives shape how accounting figures are
reported. Their results indicate that managers’ financial reporting is affected by the extent
of State involvement and that a high quality judicial system with strong enforcement and
diffuse equity ownership leads to conservative accounting.
Culture
Culture, by influencing the development of cross-country institutional factors,
may also contribute to the variations found in the value relevance of earnings and book
value. Hofstede (1984) developed dimensions of cultural values that he posits help to
explain the formation of societies. The three dimensions relevant to this study are
described in Hofstede (1984) as follows:
Individualism versus Collectivism
The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of
interdependence a society maintains among individuals. It relates to
people's self-concept: 'I' or 'we'.
Large versus Small Power Distance
The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is how a society
handles inequalities among people when they occur. This has obvious
consequence for the way people build their institutions and organisations.
Strong versus Weak Uncertainty Avoidance
The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is how a society reacts
on the fact that time only runs one way and that the future is unknown:
whether it tries to control the future or to let it happen. Like Power
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance has consequences for the way people
build their institutions and organizations (pp. 83–84).
Gray (1988) built on Hofstede’s (1980) and (1983) studies of the dimensions of
societal values by using cluster analysis to group cultures based on their scores on these
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four value dimensions, historical factors, and geographical factors. He then hypothesized
that the international patterns of accounting systems should be related to their cultural
area. In Hofstede’s model, external factors, such as the forces of nature, international
investment and trade, and conquest, form social values. These values, in turn, influence
institutional factors, such as the political and legal systems, patterns of corporate
ownership, and the nature of the capital market. Gray’s (1988) analytical study extends
Hofstede’s (1980) and (1983) models by showing how accounting systems are impacted
by the accounting values of the accountants, who are influenced by the societal values in
the formation of their attitudes and value systems. Gray (1988) describes value
dimensions at the accounting subculture level as:
Professionalism versus Statutory Control — a preference for the exercise
of individual professional judgment and the maintenance of professional
self-regulation as opposed to compliance with prescriptive legal
requirements and statutory control.
Uniformity versus Flexibility — a preference for the enforcement of
uniform accounting practices between companies and for the consistent
use of such practices over time as opposed to flexibility in accordance
with the perceived circumstances of individual companies.
Conservatism versus Optimism — a preference for a cautious approach to
measurement so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as
opposed to a more optimistic, laissez-faire, risk-taking approach.
Secrecy versus Transparency — a preference for confidentiality and the
restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those
who are closely involved with its management and financing as opposed
to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach. (p. 8)
Hope (2003) used two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance
and individualism, as controls in his cross-country study that examined disclosure
practices, the enforcement of securities standards, and analyst forecast accuracy. His
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multivariate results indicate that uncertainty avoidance was significantly positively
related to analyst forecast accuracy.
Hope et al. (2008) examined whether auditor choice is related to the national
culture by using a measure of secretiveness based on Hofstede’s (1980) cultural factors
and Gray’s (1988) framework that linked Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to
accounting values. Hope et al.’s (2008) results indicate that firms domiciled in “more
secretive” (p. 357) countries are less likely to hire Big 4 auditors. This relationship is
mitigated by the degree of globalization of the firm. Their findings established a link
between financial reporting quality and national culture through the firm’s choice of
auditor.
In their study examining the relation between earnings management and investor
protection and national culture, Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) found outside investor
rights to be negatively related to earnings management, which was consistent with Leuz,
Nanda, and Wysocki’s (2003) findings. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai’s (2007) results
suggest that culture plays an important role in determining accounting choices.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Accounting research has provided empirical evidence that the earnings figure
contained in financial reports is important to the users of the reports for their investing
and/or credit decisions (Biddle et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2003; Liu et al. 2002).
Ultimately, the correctness of decisions made based on the accounting numbers can vary
depending on the value relevance of those reported numbers. When the user expands the
pool of firms they are evaluating to a mix of international firms, understanding the
possible variations in the value relevance of accounting information becomes even more
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critical. Cultural research has suggested that a society’s value dimensions could affect the
development of the country’s legal and political systems, the enforcement levels of their
laws, the accounting standards, and even management’s incentives for financial reporting
(Gray 1988). Academic research has also provided evidence that the origin of the
country’s legal system, the strength of the legal system, and the level of secrecy in the
underlying culture can affect the firm’s financial reporting (Ali & Hwang 2000;
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Gray 1988; Hope 2003; Hope et al.
2008; Hung 2001; Kang 2003; La Porta et al. 1998).
As business and investing continue to expand globally, many believe that a set of
financial reporting standards to be used in all countries would mitigate the cross-country
variations in financial reporting and the quality of the reported numbers. To that end, the
IFRS Foundation and IASB state on their website that “The goal of the IFRS Foundation
and the IASB is to develop, in the public interest, a single-set of high-quality global
accounting standards” (IFRS Foundation and the IASB, 2011). Even though the number
of companies using IFRS for their financial reporting has increased, not all have
transitioned to IFRS as issued by the IASB; many have adopted their national version of
IFRS. I argue that IFRS is not a single-set of global accounting standards at this point and
may still reflect the reporting preference of the local country, which may be influenced
by institutional factors and the secrecy of the underlying culture. Defining value
relevance as the information content provided by accounting information overall and
individually, I predict that the cross-country factors will continue to be associated with
the overall value relevance of accounting information and with the value relevance of
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earnings and the book value of equity when IFRS are used to prepare the financial
reports.
Research has shown that civil law countries provide weaker shareholder
protection and have a more concentrated share ownership than common law countries (La
Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). Given that IFRS reporting is intended to improve
the quality and transparency of financial reporting, I suggest that, when IFRS are used for
financial reporting as compared to domestic standards, that there is more of an increase in
the value relevance of accounting information for firm’s domiciled in countries with a
civil law legal origin, as compared to a common law legal origin, and that legal origin
will continue to be a significant factor in explaining price. The variable of interest for this
hypothesis is the indicator dummy, ORIGIN, which has a value equal to 1 if the firm is
domiciled in a country with a common law legal origin. I have chosen to include common
law instead of civil law legal origin in the model because the Pearson correlation between
French civil law and the secrecy of the culture is 0.870, which could create challenges
with multicolinearity. Therefore, I interpret a negative coefficient on ORIGIN to indicate
that the change was positive for civil law countries. My first hypotheses regarding the
association of a country’s legal origin and the value relevance of accounting information
when IFRS are used for financial reporting, stated in the null, is:
H1: There is no association between the legal origin of a country and
the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS are used for
financial reporting.
An element in determining whether shareholder protection is high can be
the strength of the legal system. If the country does not provide legal remedies to
enforce the proper application of its financial accounting reporting standards,
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external users may perceive that there is less value relevant information being
provided by the issued financial reports. While the strength of the legal regime
may be an important factor when various domestic standards are used, even if the
international standards are superior to the domestic standards, the ability to
enforce the proper implementation of those standards remains important.
Therefore, I posit that the proxy for the strength of the legal system, LAW, it will
continue to be important in the explanation of price when IFRS are used for
financial reporting. My second hypothesis, stated in the null form, is:
H2: There is no association between the strength of the legal system of
a country and the value relevance of accounting information when
IFRS are used for financial reporting.
When a culture is considered to be highly secretive, the value relevance of
the financial reports prepared according to their national accounting standard may
be less than when financial reports are prepared according to accounting standards
of a more open culture. Since one of the goals of the development and
implementation of international standards is to reduce the information asymmetry
between the firm and the external users of the financial statements, I posit that
IFRS should mitigate some of the effects of secretive cultures. The challenge is
that not all countries are implementing IFRS as promulgated by the IASB, which
may create differences in the reported numbers and not totally mitigate the effect
of a secretive culture. My third hypothesis, stated in the null form, is:
H3: There is no association between the secretiveness of a country’s
culture and the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS
are used for financial reporting.
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SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample
The sample firms in this study are those from sixteen countries that transitioned to
IFRS during the sample period of 2000–2009 and are used in the price and return models,
respectively, in Chapter 2. The financial and price data are collected from Compustat
Global and the accounting standard classifications from Worldscope. Data related to
calculating the secrecy measure, SECRECY, are collected from Geert Hofstede’s “matrix
of dimension scores” (2012), available for research on the Research and VSM tab of
Geert and Gert Jan Hofstede’s website. Data indicating the strength of the country’s legal
system for the LAW variable are found in The Economic Freedom of the World: 2010
Annual Report (Gwartney, Hall, & Lawson 2010b), which is published by The Fraser
Institute and available online. The classifications of civil and common law countries are
taken from Barth et al. (2011) and La Porta et al. (1997).
The final price model sample includes 888 firms, with a total of 5,130 firm-year
observations; the return model sample includes 843 firms, with a total of 4,684 firm-year
observations.
Variable Descriptions
The dependent variables used for the two valuation models are stock price,
PRICE, which is measured as the firm’s stock price six months after fiscal year-end, and
the firm’s annual stock return, RETURN, measured as the cumulative percentage change
in stock price beginning nine months before fiscal year-end and ending three months after
fiscal year end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits.
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The independent variables of interest to this study that evaluate the effects of
institutional factors include the country-specific institutional factors shown by prior
research to be related to variations in managers’ incentives for financial reporting and
earnings (Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006;
Lang et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998).
A proxy for the level of shareholder protection of a country, ORIGIN, is an
indicator variable that will take on a value of 1 if the country’s legal regime is based on
common law, and zero otherwise. La Porta et al. (1998), Hung (2001), and Bushman and
Piotroski (2006), use ORIGIN as a proxy for the extent of the country’s investor
protection. Prior research has provided evidence that countries based on common law
have higher levels of protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998).
Therefore, I predict that firms located in civil law countries will show more of change in
the value relevance of their accounting information when IFRS are used for financial
reporting, as compared to firms located in common law countries.
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) uses the rating from the EFW 2002 Annual Report
and 2003 dataset for their judicial impartiality variable to capture whether the legal
framework could be trusted to provide private businesses the ability to contest the legality
of a government’s actions or regulations. In this study, I am interested in the strength of
the legal system and its ability to ensure that private businesses and shareholders have
avenues available to seek remedy for violations of regulations and to enforce contracts.
When the legal regime and enforcement are stronger, manager’s opportunistic behavior
may be reduced and the resulting financial statements are more value relevant. The
proxy for the strength of the country’s legal and enforcement framework that is used in
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this study, LAW, is the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and
Property Rights available in The Fraser Institute’s EFW 2010 Annual Report. As stated
in the ETW 2010 Annual Report (Gwartney et al. 2010a) this measure was developed to
mitigate the problem that arises when the composition and number of components
changes over time. The ETW 2010 Annual Report uses 2000 as a base year and “changes
in a country’s chain-linked index through time are based only on changes that were
present in adjoining years” (p. 12). Therefore, as described in the ETW 2010 Annual
Report, measure is a composite rating based on the following attributes of the country:
(1) judicial independence,
(2) impartial courts,
(3) protection of property rights,
(4) military interference in rule of law and the political process,
(5) integrity of the legal system,
(6) legal enforcement of contracts, and
(7) regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. (p. 5)
The ratings are based on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 indicating that the
country has high economic freedom, i.e., a strong legal regime. The countryyear observations will be classified as having a stronger legal and enforcement
system if the composite score for that country’s most recent rating is greater
than or equal to the sample median for that year. Annual ratings are available for
the years 2000–2008; following Bushman and Piotroski (2006), which based the
country-year observations on the nearest rating available, I use the 2008 rating
for firm-year observations in 2009.
Gray (1988) extended Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions by linking national
culture with accounting systems. Gray (1988) posited that accountants develop their
value systems and attitudes, including work-related values, from their society’s values
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and that these resultant “accounting ‘values’” (p. 5) impact the development of
accounting systems. Gray’s (1988) fourth hypothesis states “The higher a country ranks
in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of
individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of
secrecy” (p. 11). He argues that cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance prefer secrecy
in order to avoid competition and conflict and to maintain security. Those societies
exhibiting high power distance are more concerned with restricting information in order
to maintain power inequalities. In collectivist societies, as opposed to individualistic
societies, secrecy would be consistent with a preference for confidentiality, because their
loyalty is more aligned with the firm than with outside parties. In this study, following
Hope et al. (2008), which used Gray’s (1988) framework and Hofstede’s (1980) value
dimension scores, I use the variable, SECRECY, as a proxy for the secrecy of the
underlying culture of the country. SECRECY is defined in Eq. (5), as:
SECRECYn = UAn + PDn – INDn

(5)

where:
SECRECYn = the country n’s secrecy score,
UAn

= Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty avoidance index score for
country n,

PDn
INDn

= Hofstede’s (1980) power distance index score for country n, and
= Hofstede’s (1980) individualism score for country n.
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I expect that, in countries with higher values of SECRECY, information
asymmetry will be higher and financial reporting will be less transparent, which would
reduce the value relevance of accounting information.
Descriptive Statistics
The model statistics for the price and return models for Paper 2 are found on
Tables 8 and 9, respectively. Panel A of both tables shows the descriptive statistics for
their respective model. The statistics for the PRICE, EPS, ΔEPS, BVPS, LEV, and SIZE
were discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and are tabulated again in Tables 8 and 9 for
reference. The cross-country institutional factors of interest to this study are described
below.
Panel A of Tables 8 and 9 report the descriptive statistics for the price and return
models, respectively. The LAW variable has a mean (median) of 8.301 (8.484) in the
price model and a mean (median) of 8.342 (8.505) in the return model. A country is
classified as having strong legal protection if its value is equal to the sample median of
8.484 or 8.505 in the price and return models, respectively.
Untabulated results of both models show that the strength of each country varied
over the sample period of 2000–2009. Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, South Africa,
and Spain have the lowest annual scores for the entire sample period, with Greece being
the lowest in all years except for 2006 when South Africa had the weakest legal system.
This finding confirms prior research that ranks countries with a French civil law legal
origin as having the weakest shareholder protection. The common law countries are
consistently in the group with stronger legal systems, except for Great Britain, which is in
the weaker group during the period of 2006–2009; Ireland, which is in the weaker group
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all of the years except 2004; and South Africa, which ranked 16th in 2006, 15th in 2001–
2004, and 14th in the remaining years; Germany and Switzerland, which have a German
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TABLE 8
Price Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa
Variables
PRICE
EPS
BVPS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
SIZE

Mean
9.427
0.476
4.767
8.301
6.181
0.643
19.137

Median
3.925
0.189
2.054
8.484
–11.000
1.000
19.010

Std. Dev.
13.550
0.824
7.076
0.765
37.845
0.479
1.989

Maximum
53.155
2.974
28.117
9.538
140
1.000
22.983

Minimum
0.127
–0.485
0.069
5.602
–33.000
0.000
15.864

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Meanc
Variables
PRICE
BVPS
EPS
LAW
SIZE

N
2,590
2,590
2,590
2,590
2,590

DS
8.192
4.355
0.387
8.500
19.003

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Mediand
IFRS
10.661
5.179
0.565
8.103
19.271

DS
3.682
1.896
0.159
8.764
18.883
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(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Std. Dev.e
IFRS
4.177
2.239
0.232
8.308
19.152

DS
12.116 (0.000)
6.714 (0.000)
0.735 (0.000)
0.806 (0.000)
1.932 (0.008)

IFRS
14.746
7.399
0.896
0.666
2.036

TABLE 8 (continued)
Price Model Statistics
Panel C: Price Model Correlationsf
Variables
PRICE
1
PRICE
BVPS
0.848
EPS
0.739
IFRS
0.045
LAW
-0.034
SECRECY
0.125
ORIGIN
-0.483
______________
a

BVPS
0.819
1
0.647
0.062
-0.066
0.139
-0.522

EPS
0.835
0.747
1
0.083
-0.124
0.116
-0.273

IFRS
0.091
0.058
0.108
1
-0.379
0.000
0.000

LAW
-0.105
-0.086
-0.133
-0.259
1
-0.384
0.019

SECRECY
0.333
0.351
0.294
0.000
-0.628
1
-0.434

ORIGIN
-0.481
-0.516
-0.375
0.000
0.041
-0.506
1

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.

b

P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

d

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

e

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower, two-tailed;
correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
Sample Period: 2000–2009
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TABLE 9
Return Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variablesa
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
LEV
SIZE

Mean
0.144
0.038
0.017
8.342
3.448
0.675
0.506
19.174

Median
0.167
0.061
0.011
8.505
-11
1
0.525
19.048

Std. Dev.
0.403
0.106
0.094
0.714
35.139
0.469
0.186
1.959

Maximum
0.906
0.196
0.276
9.495
140
1
0.801
22.957

Minimum
-0.684
-0.246
-0.17
5.602
-33
0
0.143
15.953

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Meanc
Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
LAW
SIZE
LEV

N
2,342
2,342
2,342
2,590
2,342
2,342

DS
0.204
0.042
0.024
8.549
19.056
0.497

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Mediand
IFRS
0.084
0.033
0.011
8.136
19.291
0.514

DS
0.224
0.065
0.014
8.778
18.921
0.516
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(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)

Std. Dev.e
IFRS
0.101
0.059
0.008
8.308
19.198
0.537

DS
0.375
0.110
0.097
0.748
1.895
0.184

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.424)

IFRS
0.420
0.101
0.091
0.613
2.014
0.187

TABLE 9 (continued)
Return Model Statistics
Panel C: Correlationsf
RETURN
1

EPS/Pt-1

∆EPS/Pt-1

0.258

0.351

0.325
IFRS
-0.147
LAW
0.079
SECRECY
0.091
ORIGIN
-0.057
SIZE
0.075
-0.003
LEV
LOSS
-0.164
__________________

Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1

a

0.280

IFRS
-0.150

LAW
0.015

SECRECY
0.078

ORIGIN
-0.059

SIZE
0.074

LEV
-0.003

LOSS
-0.167

1

0.309

-0.039

-0.149

0.115

-0.017

0.283

0.129

-0.827

0.447
-0.070
-0.100
0.114
-0.014
0.182
0.090
-0.721

1
-0.081
-0.008
0.067
-0.039
-0.016
-0.005
-0.231

-0.068
1
-0.411
0.000
0.000
0.058
0.049
-0.003

-0.015
-0.289
1
-0.311
0.047
-0.006
-0.073
0.088

0.041
0.000
-0.610
1
-0.470
-0.040
0.016
-0.036

-0.026
0.000
0.068
-0.526
1
-0.035
-0.142
0.035

-0.067
0.060
-0.017
0.017
-0.041
1
0.231
-0.369

-0.020
0.045
-0.067
0.115
-0.142
0.252
1
-0.136

-0.193
-0.003
0.112
-0.087
0.035
-0.363
-0.173
1

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.
P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

b

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

d

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

e

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower, two-tailed;
correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
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civil legal origin, are consistently in the stronger group, except for 2003, when
Switzerland’s score is below the median. Scandinavian civil origin countries consistently
are in group with the strongest legal systems, except for Sweden in 2005 and Norway for
the years 2000–2002 and 2004.
The third cross-country factor in this paper is the secrecy of the underlying
culture. The SECRECY variable has a mean (median) of 6.181 (-11) in the price model
and a mean (median) of 3.448 (-11) in the return model. In both studies, the minimum
score was -33 and the maximum score was 140. These statistics are based on the values
for each firm-year observation and, since the value for each country does not change over
time, the mean and median would be biased to the extent that the number of firm years
per country is unbalanced. Therefore, in the classification process for SECRECY, I use
the median calculated by using the values of the sixteen countries and do not consider
firm-year observations over time. Based on this method of calculation, the mean (median)
of the sample countries is 36.6 (26.5). The countries’ secrecy scores range from the two
lowest, Denmark with a score of -33 and Great Britain with a score of -19, to the two
highest, Greece with a score of 137 and Portugal with a score of 140. Using this median
as the benchmark to determine whether a country is more secretive or less secretive, I
find that Denmark (-33), Great Britain (-19), Sweden (-11), New Zealand (-8), Ireland
(-7), Australia (-3), Norway (12), and Switzerland (24) are equal to or greater than the
country sample median. Those countries which are classified as more secretive are
Finland (29), Germany (33), South Africa (33), France (83), Belgium (84), Spain (92),
Greece (137), and Portugal (140).
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The differences between the domestic accounting standards and international
accounting standard periods for PRICE, BVPS, EPS, ΔEPS, LEV, and SIZE are discussed
in Chapter 2 and are reported again in Panel B of Tables 8 and 9, the price and return
models, respectively. I do not report differences for SECRECY or ORIGIN because they
do not change over time.
For both models, LAW has a mean (median) of 8.5 (8.764) in the domestic
standards period and a mean (median) of 8.103 (8.308) in the IFRS period. These
differences are highly significant and suggest that the strength of the legal systems of the
sample countries decreased in the IFRS period as compared to the DS period, which is
contrary to what I would have expected, but confirms the result reported earlier of Great
Britain being classified in the weaker group for the years 2006–2009. On the other hand,
the variability of LAW is less in the IFRS period (0.666) than in the DS period (0.806)
and is highly significant at the 0.008 level. I interpret these results to indicate that overall,
the strength of the legal systems was more stable from year-to-year in the IFRS period, as
compared to the DS period.
Panel C of Tables 8 and 9 reports the correlations of the variables discussed in
Chapter 2, with the addition of the cross-country variables in this paper. In the price
model, the relationship between LAW and PRICE, BVPS, and EPS is negative and highly
significant. The Spearman (Pearson) correlations of LAW with each of these three
variables are -0.034 (-0.105), -0.066 (-0.086) and -0.124 (-0.133), respectively. The
negative Spearman (Pearson) correlations of ORIGIN with PRICE, BVPS, and EPS
are -0.483 (-0.481), -0.522 (-0.516), and -0.273 (-0.375), respectively; whereas
SECRECY has a positive relationship with PRICE, BVPS, and EPS. The Spearman
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(Pearson) correlations are 0.125 (0.333), 0.139 (0.351), and 0.116 (0.294). All of the
relationships are highly significant. This relation shows up in the sample data with the
higher-priced stock generally being from firms domiciled in civil law countries, which
traditionally have less investor protection and are more secretive. A possible explanation
for the higher price in the civil law countries could be that firms from those countries
generally have more concentrated ownership than firms domiciled in common law
countries where ownership is more diverse. In the US, where ownership is also diverse
and the percentage of share ownership smaller, if a stock price becomes high, firms will
often split the stock in order to reduce the market price to be more attractive to investors.
It is possible that firms in common law countries employ similar measures to keep their
stock prices within a range where more investors are willing to purchase their stock.
Firms in civil law countries, with either family-owned businesses or more concentrated,
institutional ownership, may not be as concerned with attracting smaller investors and do
not consider that higher stock prices to be problematic in attracting investors.
The return model shows similar relations except for LAW and RETURN, which
have a positive relationship and Spearman and Pearson correlations of 0.079 and 0.015,
respectively. The Spearman and Pearson correlations for LAW and EPS/Pt-1 are -0.100
and -0.149 and for LAW and ΔEPS/Pt-1 are -0.008 and -0.015, respectively. All of these
relations are highly significant, except for the Pearson correlation for LAW and
ΔEPS/Pt-1, which is not significant at any level.
SECRECY has a positive relation with RETURN and correlations of 0.091 and
0.078; with EPS/Pt-1 and correlations of 0.114 and 0.115; and with ΔEPS/Pt-1 and
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correlations of 0.067 and 0.041. All of the correlations are highly significant and are
reported as the Spearman and Pearson values, respectively.
Consistent with the price model, the correlations between ORIGIN and the three
variables of interest are negative. The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between ORIGIN
and RETURN is -0.057 (-0.059); between ORIGIN and EPS/Pt-1 is -0.014 (-0.017); and
between ORIGIN and ΔEPS/Pt-1 is -0.039 (-0.026). The correlations are all highly
significant except for the relation with EPS/Pt-1, which is not significant. I interpret these
results, of larger returns for firms that are domiciled in countries that are of civil legal
origin, more secretive, and/or have weaker legal systems, to be consistent with finance
theory that investors demand higher returns when they perceive the risk to be higher.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
To test my hypotheses that the legal origin of the firm’s country of domicile, the
strength of the country’s legal system, and/or the level of secrecy of the underlying
culture continues to provide value relevant information when IFRS is used for financial
reporting, H1, H2, and H3, respectively, I estimate the following returns-based model,
Eq. (6):
RETURNit = α0 + α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/Pit-1 + α3IFRSit + α4 LAWit
+ α5SECRECYni + α6ORIGINmi + α7(EPSit /Pit-1)*IFRSit
+ α8(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)*IFRSit + α9(EPSit /Pit-1)*LOSSit + α10(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*LOSSit
+ α11(EPSit /Pit-1*SECRECYni + α12(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*SECRECYni
+ α13(EPSit- /Pit-1 *ORIGINmi + α14(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*ORIGINmi + α15LOSS it
+ α16 SIZEit + α17LEVit +αa∑INDUSTRYji + αb∑ YEARit + εit
(6)
where:
RETURNit = the firm’s annual stock return at time t, measured as the
cumulative percentage change in stock price beginning nine
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months before fiscal year-end and ending three months after fiscal
year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits;
EPSit = net income per share for firm i at time t;
ΔEPSit = the dollar change in net income per share for firm i at time t;
Pit-1 = beginning of the year price for firm i;
IFRSit = an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the financial statements
are prepared according to a version of IFRS during that year, and
zero otherwise;
ORIGINmi = a proxy for shareholder protection, measured as indicator
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the legal regime of the firm’s
country of domicile is based on English common law, and zero
otherwise;
LAWit

= the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and
Property Rights available in the EFW 2010 Annual Report based
on a scale of 0 to10 (low to high). The country-year observations
will be classified as having a stronger legal and enforcement
system if the composite score for that country’s most recent rating
is greater than or equal to the sample median for that year;

SECRECYni = a measure of secrecy that uses Hofstede’s (1980) value dimension
scores for the firm’s country of domicile and is defined as the sum
of the uncertainty avoidance index score and the power distance
index score minus the individualism score for the country; and the
controls are:
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SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal yearend for firm i at time t;
LEVit

= total liabilities divided by total assets;

INDUSTRYji = the firm’s industry classification;
YEARit = an indicator variable denoting the year;
LOSSit

= an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if EPSit/Pit-1 is
negative for firm i at time t, and zero otherwise; and

εit = the error term.
As an additional test of H1, H2, and H3, that the value relevance of accounting
information when IFRS is used for financial reporting, as opposed to domestic financial
reporting, is related to one or more of the three cross-country institutional factors,
namely, the legal origin of the country, the strength of the country’s legal system, and the
secrecy of the underlying culture, I estimate the following price-based model, Eq. (7):
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4LAWit + α5SECRECYni
+ α6ORIGINmi + α7BVPSit*IFRSit + α8EPSit*IFRSit + α9BVPSit* SECRECYni
+ α10EPSit* SECRECYni + α11BVPSit* ORIGINmi + α12EPSit* ORIGINmi
+ α13SIZEit + αa∑INDUSTRYji + εit
(7)
where:
PRICEit = stock price, measured six months after the firm’s fiscal year-end;
BVPSit = book value of equity per share, excluding extraordinary items at fiscal
year-end;
EPSit = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items;

91

εit = the error term; and
the remaining variables are as previously defined.
Both of these models are estimated in Eviews 7 using GLS estimation with period
SUR weights and White period standard error correction to correct for heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation of the residuals and to obtain more efficient parameter estimates
and correctly calculated t and F statistics.
Research has shown that, in general, the adoption and use of IFRS results in an
increase in the value relevance of accounting information. One of the reasons given to
explain this relationship is that the international standards are intended to be of higher
quality than national standards. If my predictions are correct, however, and cross-country
institutional factors continue to affect financial reporting when IFRS is used, the
coefficients on ORIGIN, LAW, and SECRECY will be statistically significant. Additional
evidence will be the statistical significance of the interaction terms between EPS/Pt-1,
BVPS, or ΔEPS/Pt-1 with SECRECY or ORIGIN. The variable, LAW, is not interacted
with the accounting variables because of very high VIFs when the interactions are added
to the model, especially with EPS.
In countries based on code law, with higher levels of secrecy, or weaker legal
regimes, however, the likelihood that the standards are not applied as intended is greater.
Prior research has shown that, in these countries, financial reporting may be less
transparent and opportunistic behavior by insiders more prevalent compared to countries
based on common law, with lower levels of secrecy, or stronger legal regimes
(Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006; Hope et al.
2008; and Lang et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al.1998). In this
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environment, the reported earnings figure may be manipulated to achieve management’s
goals and may not be a fair indication of the firm’s earnings for that period. Therefore, I
predict that earnings will be less value relevant and that the book value of equity will be
more value relevant in countries based on code law, with higher levels of secrecy, or with
weaker legal regimes because the external user will have less confidence in the reported
earnings amount.
Results for the price model are reported in Table 10 and in Table 11 for the return
model. The indicator variable, IFRS, is 0.237 and marginally significant in the price
model and is 0.060 and highly significant in the return model. The interactions between
IFRS and EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/Pt-1 are 0.154 and 0.079 in the return model and neither
variable is significant. The price model has similar results, with a coefficient value of
0.028 and 0.068 for the interaction of IFRS and EPS and BVPS, respectively. The
significance of the IFRS variable indicates that the transition to IFRS from DS increases
the value relevant information contained in the accounting amounts.
In the return model, the coefficients for EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/Pt-1 are 2.278 and
0.571, respectively, both positive and highly significant. In the price model, the
coefficients for EPS and BVPS are both highly positively significant and the values are
0.823 and 5.158, respectively. Size is highly significant in both models and leverage is
significant in the return model.
The first hypothesis, H1, posits that here is no significant association between the
legal origin of a country and the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS
are used for financial reporting, as compared to when Domestic Accounting Standards
are used. In the price model containing the IFRS period and the DS period, the coefficient
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TABLE 10
Regression of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, IFRS, and Cross-Country
Factors
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4LAWit + α5SECRECYni
+ α6ORIGINmi + α7BVPSit*IFRSit + α8EPSit*IFRSit + α9BVPSit* SECRECYni
+ α10EPSit* SECRECYni + α11BVPSit* ORIGINmi + α12EPSit* ORIGINmi
+ α13 SIZEit + αbj∑INDUSTRYji + εit

Variable
Intercept
BVPS
EPS
IFRS
LAW

Pred.
Sign
?
+
+
+
+

SECRECY

–

ORIGIN

+

BVPS*IFRS

–

0.028

EPS*IFRS

+

0.068

BVPS*ORIGIN

–

-0.188

EPS*ORIGIN

+

-1.328

BVPS*SECRECY

–

0.003 **

0.004 **

0.004 ***

EPS*SECRECY
SIZE

–
+

-0.011
1.261 ***

-0.022
1.044 ***

-0.017
1.124 ***

Industry Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²
_________________

Full Sample
-18.329 ***
0.823 ***
5.158 ***
0.237 *
-0.144

DS Firms
-10.325 ***
0.730 ***
7.381 ***

IFRS Firms
-19.270 ***
0.785 ***
6.134 ***

-0.643 ***

0.306

-0.017 **

-0.030 ***

-0.013

-2.770 ***

-2.597 ***

-2.846 ***

None Sig.
5,180
0.711

0.232
-3.805 ***

None Sig.
2,590
0.780

-0.346
-0.085

None Sig.
2,590
0.764

a

Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period SUR weights and White
period correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations.
b

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and in U$.

c

t-stats are in italics; two-tailed p-values are reported.

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

94

TABLE 10 (continued)
Regression of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, IFRS, and Cross-Country
Factors
Variable Definitions:
PRICE = stock price six months after fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in
US$;
BVPS = book value per share at fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in US$;
EPS = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end, adjusted for
capital changes and in US$;
IFRS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards, and zero otherwise;
LAW = the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and Property Rights
available in the EFW 2010 Annual Report based on a scale of 0 to10 (low to high);
SECRECY = a measure of secrecy that uses Hofstede’s (1980) value dimension scores
for the firm’s country of domicile and is defined as the sum of the uncertainty avoidance index
score and the power distance index score minus the individualism score for the country;
ORIGIN = a proxy for shareholder protection, measured as indicator variables that take
on a value of 1 if the legal regime of the firm’s country of domicile is based on English common
law, and zero otherwise;
SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end; and
INDUSTRY = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm’s two-digit SIC code, and
zero otherwise.

on the variable LAW, -0.144, is negative and insignificant. I interpret this to mean that for
every unit increase in the strength of the legal system, price falls by -0.144 cents per
share. A comparison of the DS period to the IFRS period shows that the coefficient for
LAW, -0.643, is negative and highly significant in the DS period, but positive and
insignificant, 0.306, in the IFRS period. This suggests that the importance of the strength
of the legal system changed in the IFRS period as compared to the DS period, but that the
difference is insignificant as evidenced by the lack of significance of LAW in the full
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TABLE 11
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, IFRS, and Cross-Country
Factors
RETURNit = α0 + α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/Pit-1 + α3IFRSit + α4 LAWit
+ α5SECRECYni + α6ORIGINmi + α7(EPSit /Pit-1)*IFRSit + α8(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)*IFRSit
+ α9(EPSit /Pit-1)*LOSSit + α10(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*LOSSit + α11(EPSit /Pit-1*SECRECYni
+ α12(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*SECRECYni + α13(EPSit-1 /Pit-1 *ORIGINmi
+ α14(ΔEPSit/Pit-1*ORIGINmi + α15LOSS it + α16 SIZEit + αbj∑INDUSTRYji
+ αc∑ YEARit + εit
Variable
Intercept
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
IFRS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN

Pred.
Sign
?
+
+
+
+
+

Full Sample
-0.166
2.278 ***
0.571 ***
0.060 ***
-0.020 **
-0.0003
-0.028 **

DS Firms
0.059
2.285 ***
0.472 ***

IFRS Firms
-0.451 ***
2.420 ***
0.836 ***

-0.023 *
-0.001
-0.039 **

-0.004
0.0002
0.011

-0.002

-0.005

(EPS/Pt-1)*IFRS

+

0.154

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*IFRS

+

0.079

(EPS/Pt-1)*SECRECY

–

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*SECRECY

–

0.003

0.002

(EPS/Pt-1)*ORIGIN

–

-0.115

-0.105

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*ORIGIN

–

0.165

(EPS/Pt-1)*LOSS

–

-2.687 ***

-2.690 **

-2.690 ***

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*LOSS
LOSS
SIZE
LEV

–
–
+
–

-0.093
0.043 *
0.018 ***
-0.070 **

-0.170
0.049
0.007 **
-0.021

-0.063
0.039
0.029 ***
-0.125 ***

Variable
Industry Indicators
Year Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²

-0.003 *

Full Sample
Consumer Sig.
Some Sig.
4,684
0.38
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0.327 *

DS Firms
None Sig.
Some Sig.
2,342
0.335

0.006 **
-0.182
-0.069

IFRS Firms
Wholesale Sig.
Some Sig.
2,342
0.427

TABLE 11 (continued)
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, IFRS, and Cross-Country
Factors
____________________
a
Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period weights and White
diagonal correction for heteroskedasticity.
b

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and in US$.

c

t-stats are italics.

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
RETURNit = the annual return for firm i at time t, measured as the cumulative percentage
change in return for the period nine months prior to the end of the fiscal year through three
months after fiscal year-end;
EPS it/Pt-1 = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end for firm i
at time t, adjusted for capital changes and scaled by beginning of year price;
∆EPS it/Pt-1 = the annual dollar change in earnings from time t-1 to t for firm i at time t,
scaled by beginning of year price;
IFRS it = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards for firm i at time t, and zero otherwise;
LAWit = the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and Property
Rights available in the EFW 2010 Annual Report based on a scale of 0 to10 (low to high);
SECRECYni = a measure of secrecy that uses Hofstede’s (1980) value dimension scores
for the firm’s country of domicile and is defined as the sum of the uncertainty avoidance index
score and the power distance index score minus the individualism score for the country;
ORIGINmi = a proxy for shareholder protection, measured as indicator variables that take
on a value of 1 if the legal regime of the firm’s country of domicile is based on English common
law, and zero otherwise;
LOSS it = an indicator variable equal to 1 if EPS are negative for firm i at time t, and zero
otherwise;
SIZE it = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end for firm i at
time t;
INDUSTRYji = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm i’s two-digit SIC code,
and zero otherwise;
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TABLE 11 (continued)
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, IFRS, and Cross-Country
Factors
Variable Definitions:
YEARit = an indicator variable equal to 1 for the firm year, and zero otherwise; and
εit = the error term.

model, which fails to reject H1. As mentioned previously, interactions between LAW and
BVPS or EPS were not added to the model because of challenges with multicolinearity.
The results of the return model suggest a similar relationship between the strength
of the legal system and returns, however, the coefficient for LAW, -0.020, is negative and
significant. This result can be interpreted to indicate that for every one unit increase in the
strength of the legal system, returns on a share of stock decrease by 0.02 cents. A
comparison of the two periods, show that LAW is negative and marginally significant,
with a coefficient of -0.023 in the DS period, but negative and insignificant, with a
coefficient of -0.004 in the IFRS period. Unlike the price model, the difference between
the two periods for the return model indicates is significant, which is evidenced by the
significance of the LAW variable in the full model, rejects H1, and suggests that there is a
significant relation between the strength of the legal system and the transition to IFRS.
This result suggests that when domestic standards are used, the information provided by a
country’s legal system is significantly more important to the explanation of returns than
when international accounting standards are used.
The second variable of interest examined in this study is the legal origin of the
country, ORIGIN. In the full price model, the coefficient on ORIGIN is negative and
highly significant, with a value of -2.770. This result indicates that when a firm is located
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in a country with a common law legal origin, stock price decreases by $2.77, which is
consistent with the sample data that stock prices are generally higher in the civil law
countries, as compared to the common law countries. In regressions partitioning the data
into the DS and IFRS periods, the coefficient on ORIGIN is -2.597 in the DS period
and -2.846 in the IFRS period; both coefficients are highly significant. These results
reject H2 and the legal origin of the firm’s country of domicile is inversely associated
with the value relevance of accounting information.
In the DS price sample, the coefficient for the interaction between BVPS and
ORIGIN, which measures the incremental value of book value per share associated with
common law legal origin, is 0.232 and not significant. For the IFRS sample, the
coefficient for the interaction between BVPS and ORIGIN is -0.346 and only marginally
significant. The results of the full sample suggest that the difference in the two periods,
however, is not significant, as evidenced by a coefficient of -1.188 that is not significant.
The interaction between EPS and ORIGIN shows that it is negative, -3.805, and highly
significant in the DS period and negative and not significant in the IFRS sample, with a
value of -0.085. As with the interaction with BVPS, the difference in the interaction of
ORIGIN and EPS between the DS and IFRS samples is insignificant, as evidenced by the
lack of significance of the interaction in the full sample, which is negative and
insignificant and has a value of -1.328. While the results show that the incremental
information provided by the book value of equity and earnings per share when IFRS is
used for financial reporting is not significant, overall, the legal origin of the country is a
significant factor in the explanation of stock price and H2 is rejected. When the firm is
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from a common law country, in general, stock price would be lower than it would be if
the firms were located in a civil law country.
The return sample results also reject H2, as evidenced by the significant negative
relation between stock price and the legal origin of the country where the coefficient on
ORIGIN in the full model is -0.028. The coefficient on ORIGIN is -0.039 in the DS
sample, which is negative and significant, but 0.011 in the IFRS sample, which is positive
and insignificant. This could suggest that the effects of the legal origin of a country might
be mitigated by the transition to international accounting standards.
The coefficients on the interaction between the origin of the legal regime and
earnings per share and change in earnings per share in the full return model are -0.115
and 0.165, respectively. Neither interaction is significant, however. This is confirmed by
the partitioning of the sample into the DS and IFRS periods. The coefficients for the
interaction between the origin of the legal regime and earnings per share and change in
earnings per share in the DS period are -0.105 and 0.327, with the interaction with EPS
insignificant and the interaction with ∆EPS marginally significant. In the IFRS period,
neither interaction is significant. The interaction with EPS is -0.182 and the interaction
with ∆EPS is -0.069. Overall, however, the highly significant coefficient on ORIGIN in
the full sample rejects H2, even though the difference in the incremental contribution of
earnings per share and the change in earnings per share when IFRS are used for financial
reporting is insignificant between periods.
The last cross-country factor considered in this paper is the secrecy of the culture.
The coefficient on the SECRECY variable in the full price sample is -0.017 and
significant at a level of 0.029. In the partitioned samples, SECRECY is negative in both
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periods, highly significant in the DS period (-0.030), but not significant in the IFRS
period (-0.013). When SECRECY is interacted with BVPS or EPS in the full sample, the
incremental effect of SECRECY on BVPS is positive and significant, with a coefficient of
0.003, whereas the incremental effect of SECRECY on EPS is negative and insignificant,
-0.011.
In the partitioned samples for the price model, the interaction, BVPS*SECRECY,
is positive and significant, with a value of 0.004 in the DS period. In the IFRS period, the
coefficient of 0.004 is positive, but, in this period, it is highly significant. The
significance of the interaction variable in the full sample indicates that the difference in
the incremental effect of the secrecy of the culture on book value per share is significant.
The interaction of EPS*SECRECY is not significant in the either period or in the full
sample. Taken all together, these results suggest that secrecy continues to provide value
relevant information and that the transition to IFRS does not totally mitigate its effects.
Thus, H3 is rejected.
The results of the return model are not as conclusive. The coefficients on the
secrecy variable are not significant in the full sample or in either of the DS or IFRS
samples. It is negative in the full sample, -0.0003, and negative in the DS sample, -0.001,
but becomes positive in the IFRS period, 0.011. This could suggest that the use of IFRS
mitigates some of the effects of a secretive culture on financial reporting, but that the
difference is insignificant.
When SECRECY is interacted with EPS/Pt-1, the coefficients are negative and
insignificant in all three sample periods. The values for the full sample period, the DS
period, and the IFRS period are -0.003, -0.002, and -0.005, respectively. The interaction
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of the change in earnings per share and the secrecy of the culture offer some support in
favor of rejecting H3. The coefficients are positive in all three sample periods. The full
sample coefficient is marginally significant, with a value of 0.003, the DS sample
coefficient is not significant and has a value of 0.002, and the IFRS sample coefficient is
significant, with a value of 0.006. The marginal significance of the coefficient in the full
sample suggests that there is a statistically significant difference between the two periods,
which offers some support to the concept that a transition to IFRS from domestic
accounting standards helps to mitigate some of the effects of a secretive culture on a
firm’s financial reports. Overall, H3 is rejected in the return model; there is a marginal
relation between the information content, or value relevance of the reported numbers, and
the secretiveness of the underlying culture.
Robustness Tests
Price Model
The value relevance of accounting information in the price model, as measured by
the Adj. R2, increases from 0.666 in the base model of price regressed on book value of
equity and earnings to 0.667 when IFRS is added to the base model, and to 0.668 when
the IFRS, and the interactions of IFRS with BVPS and EPS are added to the base model.
To this model, the variables of interest to Paper 2, LAW, SECRECY, and ORIGIN, are
added, along with the interaction of EPS and BVPS with the SECRECY and ORIGIN
variables, which increased the Adj. R2 to 0.684. The interaction between the accounting
figures and LAW are not explored because of the high VIFs when they are included,
which is suggestive of multicolinearity. To check whether the choice of control affects
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the results of the model, the controls are added individually in separate regressions. The
results are robust to the inclusion of size and industry.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, firms from Great Britain and Australia combined
account for 52.87 (53.40) percent of the sample firms (firm-year observations), which
could introduce bias into the model. A regression is run on the full sample that excludes
these two countries and the results change in that LAW becomes significant, SECRECY
becomes highly significant, and IFRS moves from marginally significant to significant.
This supports the idea that common law countries have better shareholder protection and
are not as influenced by the strength of the legal system and the secrecy of the culture as
compared to civil law countries. However, the change in significance suggests that the
lack of firms from other countries may result in biased results and that they should be
relied upon with caution. Future studies could address this issue by increasing the number
of countries included, which will be possible with an extension of the sample period.
Two additional regressions are run to check for scale related challenges. The first
regression includes total assets as an independent variable. The results of this regression
are robust to the reported model’s results. The second regression adds the inverse of the
number of common shares outstanding to the model. As with the previous regression, the
results are robust.
Return Model
The return model results are checked for robustness in the same manner as the
price model above. First, to check whether the value relevance, as measured as the Adj.
R2, increases when IFRS is used for financial reporting, the base model of returns
regressed on earnings per share, the change in earnings per share, loss, and the interaction
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of the accounting amounts and loss is estimated. The Adj. R2 for this model is 0.190.
When IFRS and its interactions with EPS and ∆EPS are added, the Adj. R2 increases to
0.201, which suggests that the value relevance of accounting information to explain the
firm’s annual return increases when a firm transitions to using IFRS for financial
reporting from the domestic accounting standards. The variables of interest to this study,
LAW, SECRECY, and ORIGIN, are added to this model and this is considered to be the
benchmark model. The controls for size, leverage, time, and industry are added to
individual regressions. All of the controls are considered to be important to the model and
are included in the reported return model.
When Great Britain and Australia are excluded from the model, the incremental
information contained in the IFRS interaction variables gains significance but the IFRS
variable decreases in significance. LAW, ORIGIN, and LEV also decrease in significance
in the model where British and Australian firms are excluded. This is consistent to the
results of the price model, that the use of IFRS and the strength of the legal system are
more important in civil law countries than in common law countries. The changes
reflected in both the price and return models when Great Britain and Australia are
eliminated from the sample suggest that the results may be biased and not generalizable
to the general population and should be considered when interpreting the results. Future
research could address this issue by adding more countries and firms to the sample.
The robustness tests for scale differences consists of two regressions; one with
total assets added as an exogenous variable and one with the inverse of the beginning of
the year price as an exogenous variables. Results of both regressions are robust to the
reported model.
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CONCLUSIONS
Paper 2 contributes to international research by showing that the secrecy of the
underlying culture, the origin of the legal regime, and the strength of the legal regime
continue to add incremental information to the overall value relevance of accounting
information and, in particular, to book value and earnings when IFRS is used for financial
reporting. In other words, the transition to IFRS has improved the value relevance of
accounting information, but the cross-country effects examined herein should continue to
be considered in any evaluations of the financial reports by external users.
The information provided by this study is of interest to external users of the
financial statements because they may enable them to more effectively assess the
reported numbers and aid in their investing and lending decisions. International standards
setters could benefit from this information in the development and enforcement of their
accounting standards for IFRS by including these factors in their considerations of the
best method for achieving their goals of a single-set of high-quality global accounting
standards and to assess whether they are reaching that goal. Securities regulators could
benefit by aiding them in the development and enforcement of their security regulations
by making them aware that the effects of cross-country institutional factors are not totally
mitigated by requiring the use of IFRS for financial reporting.
A limitation of this study is that there may be other factors that contribute to the
changes in the value relevance of accounting information that are not included in my
model, such as the refinement of the standards over time by the standard setters, the
development and enforcement of more consistent auditing standards, the strength of the
enforcement of IFRS reporting by the various standards setters, and the level of
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understanding of the application of IFRS by the preparers of the financial statements.
These factors could be investigated in future studies. A second limitation of this study is
that the majority of firms began reporting according to IFRS at the end of the sample
period. Future research could include more recent years, which would allow comparisons
over longer period of IFRS reporting. Third, the potential determinants of the differences
between the DS and IFRS are not examined and could be addressed in future studies.
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CHAPTER 4: THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MEASURES ON IFRS FINANCIAL REPORTS
INTRODUCTION
This study examines whether a firm’s corporate governance measures provide
incremental information related to the value relevance of accounting information when
IFRS are used for financial reporting. The consideration of corporate governance is
important because research has shown that stronger corporate governance provides more
effective monitoring of the firm’s financial accounting processes, which may contribute
to an improvement of the quality of financial reporting (Niu 2006). The consideration of
economic losses that have occurred in the last decade as the result of financial scandals,
such as Enron and WorldCom, or to the failure of large firms to properly manage risk
and/or business practices, such the financial crisis in the late 2000’s that resulted in the
demise of several large financial institutions, also point to the need for stronger
governance. Broadly speaking, corporate governance refers to the mechanisms that are
used to ensure that management does not engage in activities that would harm the
stakeholders of the firm. When an investor buys stock in the firm or a creditor lends it
money, they do so expecting to receive a return on their investment. One method of
providing assurance to the investor or creditor that management will operate the firm in a
manner that will provide a return on their capital investment is through the
implementation of corporate governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). These
measures may be internally developed, such as board and audit committee independence,
or they may be mandated by outside sources, such as securities regulations and
accounting standards. This paper addresses the corporate governance mechanisms
implemented by the firm.
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The need for corporate governance mechanisms to limit management’s
opportunistic behavior can be explained by information asymmetry and agency theory.
Agency theory is based on the separation of ownership and control that creates a conflict
of interest between the principal (owner) and the agent of a firm (management). The
tension between the two occurs because the principal cannot observe the actions of the
agent. Information asymmetry occurs because the agent/manager has inside knowledge of
the operations and future prospects of the firm that the owners/shareholders do not have
access to. In this scenario, management may use this private information to increase their
wealth at the expense of the shareholders through measures like the consumption of
perquisites or expropriate of assets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, if
management’s compensation is tied to the earnings figure and attaining that figure seems
unlikely, the manager could employ methods to manage earnings in the current period,
such as delaying research and development or repairs and maintenance until future
periods. The resultant reduction in expenses this period could help to maintain the income
level required for their bonus, but the earnings figure would not be a true reflection of the
financial earnings capability of the firm during that period of time and could result in a
loss in earnings in future periods due to few new products being introduced or to the need
to replace equipment that had not been maintained properly. This could mislead external
users who rely on the integrity of the financial statements for their capital allocation
decisions. To compensate for the increased risk that they would be assuming,
stakeholders require a higher return on their investment, which increases the agency costs
the firm incurs. In order to reduce agency costs and to send a signal that they will not
engage in opportunistic behavior to the stakeholders’ detriment, firms may increase the
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strength of their internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as choosing a Big 4
auditor, which would limit the ability of management to transfer wealth to themselves
(Hope et al. 2008; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). On the
country level, corporate governance could include implementing securities regulations
and accounting standards and then providing the ability to enforce them though a strong
legal system.
The importance of studying corporate governance can be illustrated by an excerpt
from Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that states:
… the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom have
some of the best corporate governance systems in the world, and the
differences between them are probably small relative to their
differences from other countries. According to Barca (1995) and
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995), Italian corporate governance
mechanisms are so underdeveloped as to substantially retard the flow
of external capital to firms. In less developed countries, including some
of the transition economies, corporate governance mechanisms are
practically nonexistent. In Russia the weakness of corporate
governance mechanisms leads to substantial diversion of assets by
managers of many privatized firms, and the virtual nonexistence of
external capital supply to firms (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995).
Understanding corporate governance not only enlightens the discussion
of perhaps marginal improvements in rich economies, but can also
stimulate major institutional changes in places where they need to be
made. (pp. 737–738)
There is also a stream of research that explores whether cross-country variations
in corporate governance systems can be explained by culture. Licht (2001) posits that
“national cultures can be seen, metaphorically, as the mother of path dependence
dynamics in the sense that they play a role in both the origin and in future development of
corporate governance systems” (p. 147). Licht (2001) describes path dependence
dynamics as “the tendency of corporate governance to preserve conditions that existed in
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the past due to economic or political reasons or simply due to historical accident”
(p. 147).
This study extends international corporate governance and value relevance
literature by investigating the research question that asks do firm-specific corporate
governance mechanisms provide incremental information to the value relevance of
accounting information when IFRS is used for financial reporting, after controlling for
cross-country institutional factors, culture, and firm characteristics.
To answer this question, I continue use the valuation models, Eq. (6) and Eq. (7).
A firm-specific corporate governance industry index that ranks firms according to how
they compare to other firms in their industry is obtained from the RiskMetrics database.
This industry index and its interaction with IFRS are added to these models to test H1.
Although it was my hope to provide empirical evidence that stronger corporate
governance mechanisms are positively related to the use of IFRS, results of the price
modes suggest that firm-specific corporate governance is not significantly related to the
use of IFRS for financial reporting and the results of the return model shows no
significance to the industry CG index and only a marginal significance between the
interaction of the CG index and IFRS. A limitation of this study, however, is the lack of
corporate governance data for the sample firms. The focus of this dissertation is on
countries that transitioned to IFRS from their domestic accounting standards during the
sample period 2000–2009. Most of the data contained in the RiskMetrics database,
unfortunately, is for firms located in the US and in countries that are not included in this
study because their transition to IFRS occurred at a later date. An additional constraint is
that the time period covered in the RiskMetrics database is 2003–2009. Future studies
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extending the sample period to include countries that transitioned to IFRS in 2009 and
later would increase the potential for significant relations, as well as developing other
measures of firm-specific corporate governance measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a
review of prior literature. The following section provides the hypotheses development,
which is followed by a discussion of sample selection, variables, and research design.
The results and concluding remarks are in the last two sections.
LITERATURE REVIEW
For capital markets to be successful, the market participants must be able to trust
the integrity, reliability, transparency, and quality of the financial reports of listed
corporations (Jain, Kim, and Rezaee 2008). In their study of the US market, they found
that market liquidity deteriorated after several corporate and financial accounting
scandals were discovered, such as WorldCom and Enron. In response to the scandals and
the resultant economic losses, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX), which strengthened regulations and enforcement in addition to requiring more
effective internal corporate governance. Their results suggest that market liquidity was
improved significantly after the implementation of SOX, which they interpreted as
indicating that the confidence of market participants regarding corporate governance,
audit functions, and financial reporting was being restored.
International research has provided evidence that the strength of corporate
governance matters as well. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that corporate governance
is a mechanism to mitigate the agency problem of the separation of ownership and
control. They suggest that concentration of ownership and legal protection of investors
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are complementary methods of corporate governance. In effective corporate governance
systems, large investors play an important role and there are legal protections for at least
some investors. In less effective corporate governance systems, the legal protection of
investors is extremely limited and firms are generally insider-dominated or family firms,
which receive little external financing.
Ball, Kothari, and Robin’s (2000) results indicate that common-law accounting
income is timelier than code-law accounting income, primarily because it is more
sensitive to economic losses. From a corporate governance standpoint, when economic
losses are incorporated into the accounting numbers quicker, controlling managerial
opportunistic behavior becomes easier because dividend restrictions and leverage are
bound more quickly. Ball et al. (2000) concludes that the conservative accounting role of
monitoring managers is an important feature of common-law corporate governance. They
also argue that this could be an explanation for the IASC’s adoption of a disclosure
approach that is more transparent, like the common-law approach, and for the
predominately common-law model that is emerging in international transacting.
In their study of how the Asian financial crisis of 1997, corporate governance
mechanisms, and the accounting system used for financial reporting affected the value
relevance of book value and earnings in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand,
Davis-Friday, Eng, and Liu (2006) found that the strength of corporate governance
mechanisms did not affect the degree of changes in the value relevance of earnings, but
did affect the value relevance of book values, which declined when corporate governance
was weak. Their results also provide evidence that the degree of changes in the book
value’s value relevance was affected by accounting standards employed. Their results
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suggest that, when an economy is in a financial crisis, the degree of change in the value
relevance of a firm’s book value and the relation between accounting information and
stock prices is not just a function the macroeconomic environment and firm-specific
financial health, but includes accounting systems used for financial reporting and
corporate governance mechanisms as well.
Several studies were conducted after financial crises resulted in a move to
strengthen corporate governance through securities regulation. Niu (2006) used two
quality of earnings measures to evaluate the belief of Canadian regulators that the
development of stronger corporate governance mechanisms would limit management’s
opportunistic behavior, which would improve the reliability and quality of financial
reporting. One of the measures used was market based to capture earnings
informativeness and the other measure was accounting based to capture earnings
management. Using a sample of Canadian firms and published corporate governance
data, the results provide evidence that the firm’s corporate governance quality was
positively related to the returns-based measure and negatively related to the level of
abnormal accruals. Nui (2006) suggests that their results are consistent with the Canadian
regulators’ belief that the adoption of corporate governance rules are a significant factor
in the improvement of the truthfulness of Canadian firm’s financial reporting.
Habib and Azim (2008) investigated the relationship between the value relevance
of accounting information and corporate governance in Australia after the formation of
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council and the
development of a “‘principles of good corporate governance practice’ code in 2002”
(p. 168). The following is a list of the corporate governance practice categories that
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Habib and Azim (2008) recommended to make up good corporate governance structures
in the firm:











solid foundations for management oversight;
value-enhancing board structure;
ethical and responsible decision-making campaigns;
ensuring integrity in financial reporting;
making timely and balanced disclosures;
respecting the rights of shareholders;
recognizing and managing risk;
encouraging enhanced performance;
executive remuneration that aligns interest of the
executives with those of the shareholders; and
recognizing the legitimate interests of stakeholders.
(p. 168)

Koh, Laplante, and Tong (2007) indicate that the expectation of the Council was that, by
improving the firm’s corporate governance, value-relevant accounting information would
be provided to the market.
Habib and Azim (2008) chose Australian firms for their study because, although
their boards’ composition and mechanisms typically follow the Anglo-Saxon design, the
Australian market is not as active or effective as the markets in the UK or US regarding
corporate control. In this environment, internal governance measures, like audit
committee and board of directors’ independence and structure, play a more important role
and provide a unique opportunity to evaluate the influence firm-level corporate
governance mechanisms may have on a firm’s value.
Their base model was the one currently being used in value relevance research, a
regression of price on earnings and book value. Using principal components analysis
(PCA) of their nine firm-specific corporate governance measures, they developed three
variables to use in their study: STRUCTURE, which captured the audit committee and
board structure dimension; INDEPENDENCE, which captured the audit committee and
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board’s independence dimension; and AQ, which captured the audit quality dimension.
Following Collins et al. (1977), that firm-specific economic factors may affect the value
relevance of accounting information, they also include the following variables: firm
profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, and firm leverage. They estimated five
models, beginning with the base model and systematically adding the corporate
governance variables and firm-specific variables, along with their interactions with book
value and earnings, to subsequent models. Their measure of value relevance was the R²
from these regressions. Habib and Azim’s (2008) results suggest that the firm’s corporate
governance structure and economic factors affect the value relevance of the firm’s
accounting information. Their results, which are consistent with the results of my study,
suggest that the firm-specific factors had more impact on value relevance than the
corporate governance factors.
Licht (2001), in his theoretical paper published in the Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law, posits that there is a need for an examination of the relation between
national culture and corporate governance. He suggests that cultural values rooted in the
individuals of a society will shape the social institutions and a society’s general social
environment. In this environment, actions are given meaning, what is socially acceptable
is defined, and sanctions exercise social control. Therefore, as the business and legal
institutions are developed, differences in the societies’ values will have an impact on the
way companies, laws, and financial markets are developed. Using the concept of path
dependency, where conditions that existed in the past can persist and affect current
circumstances, Licht (2001) states that:
A nation’s culture can be perceived as the mother of all path
dependencies. Figuratively, it means that a nation’s culture might be
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more persistent than other factors believed to induce path dependence.
Substantively, a nation’s unique set of cultural values might indeed
affect – in a chain of causality – the development of that nation’s laws
in general and its corporate governance system in particular. (p. 150)
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) examined how the characteristics of a country,
such as minority shareholder protection and the level of financial and economic
development, influence the firm’s decision to improve their corporate governance
mechanisms. Their results suggest that the choice is dependent on the benefits and costs
to do so. In countries where development is weak, improving internal corporate
governance is costly because of the political costs of good governance, lack of depth in
the capital markets, and deficiencies in the institutional infrastructure. As a result,
investor protection in these countries is poor. Doidge et al. (2007) posits that as financial
markets become more global, the importance of the country characteristics declines and
there are more incentives for the firm to strengthen its corporate governance.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Corporate governance is established, either externally by laws and/or securities
regulations or internally by the firm, to reduce the management’s opportunistic behavior
and to protect the stakeholders’ interests. Factors of effective corporate governance
include, among others, a strong legal system that provides protection for minority
shareholders, an independent board of directors, a strong audit committee, and separation
of the positions of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board (COB).
From a financial standpoint, the efficacy of corporate governance can impact the integrity
of the financial reporting process. If it is weak, opportunities arise for management to
manage earnings or to engage in fraudulent behavior, all to the detriment of the
shareholders. The widespread economic loss that resulted from the fall of Enron
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illustrates the importance of good corporate governance. In this instance, the damage
reached well beyond the stakeholders of that particular firm. The passage of SOX in the
US and the global move for regulators and standards setters to regulate or to encourage
good corporate governance highlights an awareness of its importance to the viability of
capital markets.
Research has shown that as the strength of corporate governance increases, the
quality of the financial reporting function improves. Higher quality reported financial
information provides more reliable information for the external user to use in their
investing and credit decisions (Ball et al. 2000; Davis-Friday et al. 2006; Habib and Azim
2008; Nui 2006; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In other words, the reported financial
accounting numbers will be more value relevant to the user. Since the goal of IFRS is to
provide a single-set of high-quality financial reporting standards, I suggest that when
IFRS is used for financial reporting, firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms will
add incremental information to the overall value relevance of accounting information. My
hypothesis, in the null form, is:
H1: There is no association between firm-level corporate
governance mechanisms and the value relevance of accounting
information when IFRS is used for financial accounting reporting.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample
The sample includes firms from Papers 1 and 2 that also have the necessary
corporate governance data. The data is obtained from Compustat Global, Worldscope,
Geert Hofstede’s “matrix of dimension scores” (Hofstede 2012), the EFW’s 2010 Annual
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Report, Barth et al. (2011), La Porta et al. (1997), and the RiskMetrics Corporate
Governance dataset for the years 2003–2009.
Table 12 presents the country, industry, and accounting standards classifications
for the price model’s sample firms. It includes 176 firms and 610 firm-year observations
from fourteen countries, which are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden. The sample’s industry composition includes 79 (294) firms (firm years) in the
consumer products category, 48 (156) firm (firm years) in the manufacturing category, 11
(26) firms (firm years) in the wholesale trade category, and 38 (134) firms (firm years) in
the retail trade category. The sample firms are primarily from common law countries,
with 131 (454) firms (firm years) compared to 45 (156) firms (firm years) from civil law
countries. An examination of differences in results between these categories is reported in
the robustness tests section.
Table 13 presents the country, industry, and accounting standards classifications
for the return model’s sample firms. It includes thirteen countries; New Zealand was
dropped because of a lack of data necessary for the return model. This sample includes
163 firms and 554 firm-year observations. Based on the two-digit SIC code classification,
the return sample contains 70 (256) firms (firm years) from the consumer products
classification, the manufacturing classification contains 45 (146) firms (firm years), the
wholesale trade classification contains 11 (26) firms (firm years), and the retail trade
classification contains 37 (126) firms (firm years). Thirty-five firms (124 firm years) are
domiciled in civil law countries and 128 firms (430 firm years) are based in common law
countries.
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TABLE 12
Price Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel A: Price Model Countries

Country
Australia
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Ireland
Norway
New Zealand
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Total

Mnemonic
AUS
BEL
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GBR
GRC
IRL
NOR
NZL
PRT
ESP
SWE

IFRS
Version
Local
EU
EU
EU
EU
EU
EU
EU
EU
EU
LOCAL
EU
EU
EU

Legal
Origina
Common
Code-F
Code-S
Code-S
Code-F
Code-G
Common
Code-F
Common
Code-S
Common
Code-F
Code-F
Code-S

% of
Firm
Firms Sample Years
28 15.91%
114
2 1.14%
6
5 2.84%
16
4 2.27%
14
9 5.11%
38
2 1.14%
6
97 55.11%
318
2 1.14%
4
4 2.27%
14
4 2.27%
12
2 1.14%
8
4 2.27%
14
3 1.70%
10
10 5.68%
36
176
100%
610

% of
Sample
18.69%
0.98%
2.62%
2.30%
6.23%
0.98%
52.13%
0.66%
2.30%
1.97%
1.31%
2.30%
1.64%
5.90%
100%

Panel B: Price Model Industry Classification

Industry
Consumer Products
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Total

Two-Digit
SIC Code
20-33
34-39
50-51
52-59

119

Firms
79
48
11
38
176

% of
Firm
Sample Years
44.89%
294
27.27%
156
6.25%
26
21.59%
134
100%
610

% of
Sample
48.20%
25.57%
4.26%
21.97%
100%

TABLE 12 (continued)
Price Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel C: Price Model Legal Origin
Legal Origin
Common
Civil
TOTAL

Civil
French
German
Scandinavian
TOTAL

Firms
131
45
176

% of
Firm
% of
Sample Years Sample
74.43%
454 74.43%
25.57%
156 25.57%
100%
610
100%

Firms
20
2
23
45

% of
Firm
% of
Sample Years Sample
44.44%
72 46.15%
4.44%
6 3.85%
51.11%
78 50.00%
100%
156
100%

Panel D: Price Model Firm Years - IFRS vs. DS

YEAR
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
TOTAL
___________________

DS
Firm
Years
84
109
110
2
0
0
0
305

IFRS
Firm
Years
0
3
63
156
47
35
1
305

a

Total
Firm
Years
84
112
196
158
47
205
1
610

French, German, and Scandinavian Code and English Common classification were
obtained from Barth et al. (2011) and La Porta et al. (1997).
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TABLE 13
Return Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications
Panel A: Return Model Countries
IFRS
Country
Mnemonic Version
Australia
AUS
Local
Belgium
BEL
EU
Denmark
DNK
EU
Finland
FIN
EU
France
FRA
EU
Germany
DEU
EU
Great Britain
GBR
EU
Greece
GRC
EU
Ireland
IRL
EU
Norway
NOR
EU
Portugal
PRT
EU
Spain
ESP
EU
Sweden
SWE
EU
Total

Legal
Origina
Common
Code-F
Code-S
Code-S
Code-F
Code-G
Common
Code-F
Common
Code-S
Code-F
Code-F
Code-S

Panel D: Return Model Industry Classification
Two-Digit
Industry
SIC Code
Consumer Products
20-33
Manufacturing
34-39
Wholesale Trade
50-51
Retail Trade
52-59
Total

Firms
26
1
4
4
7
1
98
1
4
4
3
1
9
163

Firms
70
45
11
37
163

% of
Sample
15.95%
0.61%
2.45%
2.45%
4.29%
0.61%
60.12%
0.61%
2.45%
2.45%
1.84%
0.61%
5.52%
100%

% of
Sample
42.94%
27.61%
6.75%
22.70%
100%

Panel C: Return Model Legal Origin
Legal Origin
Common
Civil
TOTAL

Firms
128
35
163

% of
Sample
78.53%
21.47%
100%
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Firm
% of
Years Sample
430 77.62%
124
22.38%
554
100%

Firm
Years
102
4
14
14
26
4
314
4
14
12
8
4
34
554

Firm
Years
256
146
26
126
554

S% of
Sample
18.41%
0.72%
2.53%
2.53%
4.69%
0.72%
56.68%
0.72%
2.53%
2.17%
1.44%
0.72%
6.14%
100%

% of
Sample
46.21%
26.35%
4.69%
22.74%
100%

TABLE 13 (continued)
Return Model
Country, Industry, and Accounting Standards Classifications

Civil
French
German
Scandinavian
TOTAL

Firms
13
1
21
35

% of
Sample
37.14%
2.86%
60.00%
100%

Firm
Years
46
4
74
124

% of
Sample
37.10%
3.23%
59.68%
100%

Panel D: Return Model Firm Years - IFRS vs. DS

Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
TOTAL
________________

DS Firm
Years
73
97
105
2
0
0
0
277

IFRS Firm
Years
0
2
56
147
42
29
1
277

Total Firm
Years
73
99
161
149
42
29
1
554

a

French, German, and Scandinavian Code and English Common classification were
obtained from Barth et al. (2011) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).

A primary limitation of this study is that matching the firms contained in the
RiskMetrics database, which has the required industry corporate governance index, and
the firms used in Paper 2, which were obtained through Compustat Global, results in a
sample that is smaller than in the previous two papers. This reduced variability and lack
of robustness when firms from Great Britain are removed from the sample impairs the
generalizability of the results contained herein. Future studies could include a longer
sample period, which would allow the inclusion of firms who transitioned to IFRS in
2009 or later and would result in a larger, more globally-representative sample.
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Variable Definitions
The dependent variables for the valuation models will be PRICE and RETURN, as
previously defined. The independent variables of interest will be the industry corporate
governance (CG) index obtained from RiskMetrics and the IFRS indicator variable. The
CG score represents the ranking of each firm as compared to other firms in the same
industry. For instance, a firm with a score of 86.5 would have better firm-level corporate
governance mechanisms than 86.5 percent of the other firms in that industry.
The following attributes are control variables that are included in the regression:
LOSS, ORIGIN, LAW, SECRECY, SIZE, and INDUSTRY, all as previously defined.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics, correlations, and differences in the means, medians, and
variances for Paper 3 for the price and return models, respectively, are found on the
following two tables. The tests of differences are the paired t-test of means, the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum Test of medians, and the Bartlett and Levene tests of the Equality of
Variances. Results are reported two-tailed unless specified otherwise.
The means and medians for the price model are reported in Panel A of Table 14.
The mean (median) for PRICE is 14.259 (7.284). The mean (median) for EPS and BVPS
are 0.698 (0.36) and 5.191 (2.556), respectively. The variable of interest in Paper 3,
INDUSTRYCGQ, has a mean (median) of 69.144 (78.6). The mean (median) of the four
controls, LAW, SECRECY, ORIGIN, and SIZE, are 8.417 (8.519), 0.597 (-19), 0.744 (1),
and 21.323 (21.596), respectively.
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TABLE 14
Price Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa
Variables
PRICE
EPS
BVPS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
INDUSTRY CGQ
SIZE

Mean
14.259
0.698
5.191
8.417
0.597
0.744
69.144
21.323

Median
7.284
0.360
2.556
8.519
-19
1
78.600
21.596

Std. Dev.
15.618
0.882
6.748
0.557
38.375
0.437
28.174
1.448

Maximum
53.155
2.974
28.117
9.467
140
1
100
22.983

Minimum
0.127
-0.485
0.069
5.602
-33
0
0
15.864

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Mean
Variables
PRICE
BVPS
EPS
LAW
INDUSTRY CGQ
SIZE

N
305
305
305
305
305
305

DS
12.704
4.779
0.569
8.592
67.692
21.25

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.013)
(0.000)

Median
IFRS
15.813
5.604
0.826
8.242
70.597
21.39

DS
6.596 (0.065)
2.341 (0.059)
0.293 (0.002)
8.634 (0.000)
79.700 (0.625)
21.477 (0.092)
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Std. Dev.
IFRS
8.123
2.788
0.428
8.326
77.000
21.766

DS
14.039 (0.001)
6.452 (0.060)
0.76 (0.000)
0.583 (0.039)
30.425 (0.005)
1.393 (0.316)

IFRS
16.932
7.017
0.973
0.469
25.695
1.501

TABLE 14 (continued)
Price Model Statistics
Panel C: Price Model Correlationsf
Variables
PRICE
BVPS
EPS
IFRS
LAW
ORIGIN
SECRECY
INDUSTRY CGQ
______________
a

PRICE
1
0.774
0.860
0.075
-0.156
-0.476
0.217
-0.219

BVPS
0.782
1
0.698
0.077
-0.181
-0.482
0.310
-0.278

EPS
0.899
0.776
1
0.123
-0.224
-0.412
0.207
-0.179

IFRS
0.100
0.061
0.146
1
-0.463
0
0
-0.020

LAW ORIGIN SECRECY
-0.338
-0.589
0.403
-0.317
-0.606
0.451
-0.358
-0.533
0.387
0
0
-0.314
1
0.373
-0.709
1
0.223
-0.668
1
-0.232
-0.538
0.081
0.647
-0.522

INDUSTRY
CGQ
-0.300
-0.325
-0.246
0.052
0.242
0.721
-0.495
1

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.

b

P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

d

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

e

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower, two-tailed;
correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
Sample Period: 2003–2009
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Panel B of Table 14 reports the results of tests of differences for the price model.
The results of the paired t-test of means indicates at the differences in the means between
the two periods were highly significant for all of the variables. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test of medians shows that the differences in the medians between the DS and IFRS
periods were not all significant. The difference in medians for INDUSTRYCGQ, the
variable of interest of this study, is insignificant, with a p-value of 0.625. The differences
in medians for EPS and LAW are highly significant at the 0.002 and 0.000 levels,
respectively. The difference in medians for PRICE, BVPS, and SIZE are marginally
significant, with p-values of 0.065, 0.059, and 0.092, respectively.
The decrease in variability of LAW is significant and the decrease in the
variability of INDUSTRY CGQ is highly significant. A possible explanation for this
decrease in variability could be that the strength of the legal systems and best practices of
corporate governance are becoming more uniform across countries as they transition to
IFRS. Variability between the periods increased for PRICE, BVPS, EPS, and SIZE. The
differences were highly significant for PRICE and EPS, marginally significant for BVPS,
and insignificant for SIZE. A possible explanation for the increase in variability of
PRICE, BVPS, and EPS could be that as financial reporting becomes more transparent,
there are fewer opportunities for management to smooth the reported earnings, which
would be reflected in the stock price and book value per share as well.
The correlations shown on Panel C of Table 14 are highly significant except for
the associations between IFRS and the following: PRICE, EPS, ORIGIN, and SECRECY.
The Pearson correlation shows the relation between IFRS and INDUSTRY CGQ to be
insignificant, but the Spearman correlation shows the relationship to be significant. This
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mixed result could indicate that the relation between these two are not as significant as I
predicted, which is confirmed when the empirical tests are run.
The descriptive statistics for the return model are shown on Panel A of Table 15
and report that the mean (median) of the dependent variable, RETURN, is 0.181 (0.198).
The exogenous variable of interest, INDUSTRY CGQ, has a mean (median) of 71.599
(80.2). The means (medians) of EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/ Pt-1 are 0.049 (0.059) and 0.015
(0.015), respectively. The control variables, LAW, SECRECY, ORIGIN, and SIZE, have
means (medians) of 8.458 (8.519), -3.599 (-19), 0.776 (1), and 21.283 (21.528),
respectively.
Panel B of Table 15 reports the results of the differences between the two periods.
The difference in means for RETURN, LAW, INDUSTRY CGQ, and SIZE are highly
significant, whereas, the differences are not significant for EPS/Pt-1 and ∆EPS/ Pt-1. The
means for RETURN and ∆EPS/ Pt-1 show a decrease in their mean values and the
remaining variables experienced an increase in their means. A potential confounding
factor in the IFRS period is the global financial crises that occurred in the later years of
the sample period. An investigation into this is beyond the scope of this study and could
be addressed in future research projects. The differences in the medians are all
insignificant expect for the decrease in the median for LAW, which is highly significant.
The variability of LAW and INDUSTRY CGQ show a significant decrease. There
is a marginally significant increase in the variability of RETURN and a marginally
significant decrease in the variability of EPS/Pt-1. The differences in variability for the
remaining variables are insignificant.
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TABLE 15
Return Model Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
INDUSTRY CGQ
SIZE

Mean
0.181
0.049
0.015
8.458
-3.599
0.776
71.599
21.283

Median
0.198
0.059
0.015
8.519
-19
1
80.2
21.528

Std. Dev.
0.299
0.066
0.066
0.498
33.432
0.417
26.842
1.438

Maximum
0.906
0.196
0.276
9.467
140
1
100
22.957

Minimum
-0.684
-0.246
-0.170
5.602
-33
0
0
15.953

Panel B: Differences between DS and IFRSb
Mean
Variables
RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/ Pt-1
LAW
INDUSTRY CGQ
SIZE
LEV

N
277
277
277
277
277
277
277

DS
0.208
0.047
0.019
8.642
80.163
21.209
0.551

(0.000)
(0.508)
(0.171)
(0.000)
(0.827)
(0.000)
(0.005)

Median
IFRS
0.154
0.05
0.011
8.274
80.200
21.357
0.569

DS
0.213
0.286
0.012
8.634
80.200
21.424
0.564
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(0.113)
(0.003)
(0.349)
(0.000)
(0.457)
(0.108)
(0.185)

Std. Dev.
IFRS
0.19
0.411
0.01
8.326
80.000
21.682
0.597

DS
0.281 (0.080)
0.729 (0.000)
0.07 (0.268)
0.507 (0.027)
28.931 (0.024)
1.395 (0.528)
0.165 (0.955)

IFRS
0.314
0.904
0.062
0.415
24.535
1.479
0.166

TABLE 15 (continued)
Return Model Statistics
Panel C: Correlationsf

RETURN
EPS/Pt-1
∆EPS/Pt-1
IFRS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
INDUSTRY CGQ

RETURN
1
0.298
0.331
-0.067
0.127
0.056
-0.109
-0.030

EPS/Pt-1
0.177
1
0.506
0.021
-0.063
0.106
-0.047
0.028

∆EPS/Pt-1
0.248
0.425
1
-0.040
0.029
0.015
-0.053
0.024

IFRS
-0.091
0.026
-0.061
1
-0.510
0
0
0.032

LAW SECRECY
0.101
0.076
-0.092
0.081
0.057
-0.026
0
-0.370
1
-0.644
1
-0.133
0.120
-0.502
0.013
-0.491

ORIGIN
-0.126
-0.024
-0.011
0
0.262
-0.625
1
0.613

INDUSTRY
CGQ
-0.042
-0.007
0.009
0.057
0.171
-0.453
0.704
1

__________________
a

All variables are defined in Appendix A. All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and reported in US$.

b

P-values, two-tailed, for the differences of means, medians, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

c

The difference in means is based on two-tailed pairwise t-tests, α = 0.05.

c

The difference in medians is based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

c

The difference in variances is based on the Levene and Bartlett Tests of the Equality of Variances.

f

Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal; all correlations in bold are significant at 10 percent or lower, two-tailed;
correlations in italics are significant at 1 percent or lower, two-tailed.
Sample Period: 2003–2009

129

Unlike the price model, Panel C of Table 15 shows that approximately half of the
associations between the variables are insignificant. The Pearson correlations between
RETURN and EPS/Pt-1, ∆EPS/ Pt-1, and ORIGIN are highly significant and significant
between RETURN and IFRS, LAW, and SECRECY. There is no significance between
RETURN and INDUSTRY CGQ. The Spearman correlations are similar except the
relation between LAW and RETURN is highly significant and between RETURN and
IFRS and SECRECY is insignificant. The insignificance of the relation between the
dependent variable and the variable of interest could explain the lack of significance for
the coefficient on INDUSTRY CGQ in the return model.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
The samples for this study, like the samples for the first two papers, have
challenges with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Therefore, both of these models
are also estimated in Eviews 7 using GLS estimation with period SUR weights and White
period standard error correction to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of
the residuals and to obtain more efficient parameter estimates and correctly calculated t
and F statistics.
Price Model
The first test of H1 is the following price-base valuation model, Eq. (8):
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4INDUSTRYCGQit
+ α5INDUSTRYCGQit*IFRSit + α6 LAWit + α7SECRECYni
+ α8ORIGINi + α9BVPSit*IFRSit + α10 EPSit*IFRSit + α12 BVPSit*SECRECYni
+ α11EPSit*SECRECYni + α13SIZEit + αbj∑ INDUSTRYji + εit
(8)

130

where:
INDUSTRYCGQ it = the firm-specific corporate governance index for
firms in one of the two-digit industrial SIC codes included in this
research, and
the other variables are as previously defined.
I predict that the existence of stronger corporate governance mechanisms in the
firm will be positively related to the value relevance of the firm’s accounting information
overall. A positive (negative) coefficient on the industry CG index variable will be
interpreted to indicate that, when IFRS is used for financial reporting, the corporate
governance mechanisms are positively (negatively) related to book value or earnings.
The results of the price model are shown on Table 16. In this model,
INDUSTRYCGQ is not significant in any of the periods and the interaction variable
between INDUSTRYCGQ and IFRS is not significant in the full sample. These results fail
to reject H1 and suggest that the firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms do not
offer significant value relevant information to explain stock price, which is contrary to
prior research. As in the return model, a possible explanation for this result is the
limitation on available data for this study. Another confounding factor in this study is the
fact that firms from Great Britain dominate the sample. Great Britain is a common law
country and traditionally has better shareholder protection in the domestic standards
period, compared to civil law firms, which may explain the lack of significant differences
between the DS period and the IFRS period. Future research that includes more countries
that have transitioned to IFRS may present a different result that is more in line with
other research.
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TABLE 16
Regression of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, IFRS, Cross-Country
Factors, and Corporate Governance
PRICEit = α0 + α1BVPSit + α2EPSit + α3IFRSit + α4LAWit + α5SECRECYni
+ α6ORIGINmi + α7INDUSTRYCGQit + α8INDUSTRYCGQit*IFRSit
+ α9BVPSit*IFRSit + α10EPSit*IFRSit + α11BVPSit* SECRECYni
+ α12EPSit* SECRECYni + α13SIZEit + αa∑INDUSTRYji + εit
Variable

Pred. Sign

Full Sample

DS Firms

IFRS Firms

Intercept

?

-2.161

-0.301

-6.431

BVPS
EPS
IFRS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
INDUSTRY CGQ

+
+
+
+
–
+
+

0.580 ***
9.283 ***
0.229
-1.170
-0.036
-6.016 ***
-0.003

0.389 **
10.467 ***

0.260 *
13.519 ***

-1.927 **
-0.056 ***
-7.191 ***
0.009

0.501
-0.014
-4.450 **
-0.011

INDUSTRYCGQ*IFRS

+

-0.006

BVPS*IFRS

–

-0.248

EPS*IFRS

+

1.874 **

BVPS*SECRECY

–

0.004

EPS*SECRECY

–

-0.026

SIZE

+

Industry Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²
____________

1.013 ***
None sig.
610
0.819

0.007 ***
-0.043 **
1.219 ***
None sig.
305
0.862

0.002
-0.015
0.465 ***
None sig.
305
0.926

a

Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period SUR weights and White
period correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations.
b

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles.

c

t-stats are in italics; two-tailed p-values are reported.

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 Levels, respectively.
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TABLE 16 (continued)
Regression of Price on Book Value of Equity, Earnings, IFRS, Cross-Country
Factors, and Corporate Governance
Variable Definitions:
PRICE = stock price six months after fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in
US$;
BVPS = book value per share at fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes and in US$;
EPS = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end, adjusted for
capital changes and in US$;
IFRS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards, and zero otherwise;
LAW = the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and Property Rights
available in the EFW 2010 Annual Report based on a scale of 0 to10 (low to high);
SECRECY = a measure of secrecy that uses Hofstede’s (1980) value dimension scores
for the firm’s country of domicile and is defined as the sum of the uncertainty avoidance index
score and the power distance index score minus the individualism score for the country;
ORIGIN = a proxy for shareholder protection, measured as indicator variables that take
on a value of 1 if the legal regime of the firm’s country of domicile is based on English common
law, and zero otherwise;
INDEX CGQ = the firm-specific corporate governance measure based on the index that
the firm is listed in and obtained from Risk Metrics;
SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end; and
INDUSTRY = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm’s two-digit SIC code, and
zero otherwise;

The coefficient on EPS is positive and highly significant in all three models,
which suggests that the earnings figure offers value relevant information to the
explanation of price. The difference between the periods is highly significant, as
suggested by the significant result in the full model. The coefficient on BVPS is also
positive in all three models. It is significant in the domestic standards period, but
decreases to marginal significance in the international standards period. The coefficient in
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the full model shows that the difference between the two periods is highly significant.
The changes in values of the coefficients between the DS and IFRS periods are consistent
with the results of Papers 1 and 2, as well as prior and contemporaneous research;
namely, that, during the DS period, more information is provided by book value per share
than the earnings figure, and, as firms transition to the international accounting standards,
the earnings figure contains more value relevant information than when domestic
accounting standards were used. This phenomenon has been explained in prior research
as indicating that when external users suspect that the financial reporting is not
transparent or of high quality, they rely on book value of equity more than the potentially
managed earnings figure. When users believe that the financial reporting has become
more transparent and of higher quality, which they perceive to occur when firms
transition to IFRS, the information in the earnings figure becomes more important and
they rely less on the book value of equity.
The interaction between BVPS and SECRECY was positive and insignificant in
the IFRS and full samples. In the DS sample, however, it was highly significant. This
supports the idea that the effect of highly secretive cultures on financial reporting is
mitigated by a transition to international reporting standards from domestic reporting
standards. The lack of significance in the full sample model suggests that the difference
between the two periods, however, is not statistically significant.
The interaction of EPS and SECRECY has a similar result and interpretation,
except that the relationship is negative and only significant in the domestic standards
period, not highly significant as book value of equity was. I interpret the differences in
significance of BVPS and EPS in the domestic standards sample to support the result that
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when there is a question of the integrity of financial reporting, more reliance is placed on
book value of equity than on the accounting earnings figure.
When BVPS or EPS were interacted with LAW, ORIGIN, or INDUSTRY CGQ, the
VIF and R2 model selection tests indicated that there are either problems with
multicolinearity or the variables were not important to the model. Therefore, they were
not included.
Consistent to the price models in Papers 1 and 2, the control for size is positive
and highly significant in all three samples.
Return Model
The second test of H1, which posits that firm-level corporate governance
mechanisms are not related to the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS
is used for financial reporting, as compared to domestic reporting, is the following
returns-based valuation model, Eq. (9):
RETURNit = α0+ α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/Pit-1 + α3IFRSit + α4INDUSTRYCGQit
+ α5INDUSTRYCGQit* IFRSit + α6LAWit + α7SECRECYni + α8ORIGINmi
+ α9(EPSit/Pit-1)*IFRSit + α10(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* IFRSit + α11(EPSit/Pit-1)*SECRECYni
+ α12(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* SECRECYni + α13(EPSit/Pit-1)*ORIGINmi
+ α14(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)*ORIGINmi + α15(EPSit/Pit-1)* LOSSit + α16(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* LOSSit
+ α17 SIZE it + α18LOSSit + αa ∑INDUSTRYji + εit

(9)

where:
the variables as previously defined.
Results for the return model are found on Table 17. The coefficients of interest
are on the industry CG variable and on the interaction between the CG variable and IFRS.
If the coefficients are significant and positive (negative), my interpretation is that it
indicates that the strength of corporate governance is positively (negatively) related to the
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TABLE 17
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, IFRS, Cross-Country
Factors, and Corporate Governance
RETURNit = α0 + α1EPSit/Pit-1 + α2ΔEPSit/Pit-1 + α3IFRSit + α4 LAWit
+ α5SECRECYni + α6ORIGINmi + α7INDUSTRYCGQit
+ α8INDUSTRYCGQit*IFRSit + α9(EPSit /Pit-1)*IFRSit + α10(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)*IFRSit
+ α11(EPSit /Pit-1)* SECRECYni + α12(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* SECRECYni
+ α13(EPSit /Pit-1)* ORIGINmi + α14(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* ORIGINmi
+ α15(EPSit /Pit-1 )*LOSSit + α16(ΔEPSit/Pit-1)* + α17LOSSit + α18 SIZEit
+ αa∑INDUSTRYji + εit
Variable
Intercept

Pred. Sign Full Sample
?
-1.216 ***

DS Firms
-1.109 ***

IFRS Firms
-1.979 ***

EPS/Pt-1

+

1.132 **

0.975

0.632

∆EPS/Pt-1
IFRS
LAW
SECRECY
ORIGIN
INDUSTRY CGQ
INDUSTRYCGQ*IFRS

+
+
+
–
+
+
+

0.413
-0.125 **
0.121 ***
0.0004
-0.093 **
-0.0002
0.0015 *

0.209

1.716

(EPS/Pt-1)*IFRS

+

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*IFRS

+

1.338 ***

(EPS/Pt-1)*SECRECY

–

0.021 ***

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*SECRECY

–

(EPS/Pt-1)*ORIGIN

0.119 **
-0.001
-0.153 *
-0.0004

0.197 ***
0.002 *
-0.054
0.002 *

-0.017
0.039 **

0.009

-0.026 **

-0.029 **

-0.014

+

1.102 **

1.758 **

0.400

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*ORIGIN

+

-0.995 **

-0.261

-0.980

(EPS/Pt-1)*LOSS

–

-2.467 ***

-2.233 *

-2.515 **

(∆EPS/Pt-1)*LOSS
LOSS
SIZE
Industry Indicators
No. of Obs.
Adj. R²
____________________

–
–
+

0.37
-0.006
0.014
Mfg. sig.
554
0.169

-0.752
0.081
0.007
Some sig.
277
0.156

2.051 ***
-0.102
0.018
None sig.
277
0.188

a

Models estimated in Eviews 7 using Panel EGLS with Period weights and White
diagonal correction for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 17 (continued)
Regression of Returns on Earnings, Change in Earnings, IFRS, Cross-Country
Factors, and Corporate Governance
b

c

All financial variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles and in US$.
t-stats are italics.

*, **, *** Indicates that the coefficients are significantly different than zero at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
RETURN = the annual return for firm i at time t, measured as the cumulative percentage
change in return for the period nine months prior to the end of the fiscal year through three
months after fiscal year-end;
EPS it/Pt-1 = earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, at fiscal year-end for firm i
at time t, adjusted for capital changes and scaled by beginning of year price;
∆EPS it/Pt-1 = the annual dollar change in earnings from time t-1 to t for firm i at time t,
scaled by beginning of year price;
IFRS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial statements were prepared
according to International Financial Reporting Standards for firm i at time t, and zero otherwise;
LAW = the country’s chain-linked summary rating for Legal System and Property
Rights available in the EFW 2010 Annual Report based on a scale of 0 to10 (low to high);
SECRECY = a measure of secrecy that uses Hofstede’s (1980) value dimension scores
for the firm’s country of domicile and is defined as the sum of the uncertainty avoidance index
score and the power distance index score minus the individualism score for the country;
ORIGIN = a proxy for shareholder protection, measured as indicator variables that take
on a value of 1 if the legal regime of the firm’s country of domicile is based on English common
law, and zero otherwise;
INDUSTRY CGQ = the firm-specific corporate governance index based on the firm’s
industry and obtained from Risk Metrics;
LOSS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if EPS are negative for firm i at time t, and zero
otherwise;
SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at fiscal year-end for firm i at
time t;
INDUSTRY = an indicator variable equal to 1 based on the firm i’s two-digit SIC code,
and zero otherwise.
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value relevance of accounting information when IFRS is used for financial reporting, as
compared to when domestic standards are used for financial reporting. If the coefficients
are not significant, I interpret the result to indicate that firm-specific corporate
governance mechanisms do not significantly affect the value relevance of earnings or
changes in earnings when IFRS is used for financial reporting. Relying on prior research,
I posit that as firm-level corporate governance mechanisms are strengthened, the value
relevance of the firm’s financial reporting will increase.
The coefficient on INDUSTRYCGQ is negative and not significant in the full
model and the DS model. It is marginally significant in the IFRS period, but the lack of
significance in the full model suggests that the difference between the two methods of
preparing financial reports is not significant. This could be interpreted to fail to reject H1,
however, the coefficient on the interaction of INDUSTRYCGQ and IFRS suggests that the
effectiveness of the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms does offer value-relevant
incremental information to the explanation of stock price and that there is a relation
between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and the use of IFRS for financial
reporting, even though it is only marginally significant with a p-value of 0.064.
Therefore, this result could be interpreted to offer support to reject H1, that states that
there is no relation between firm-level corporate governance effectiveness and stock
returns when IFRS is used for financial reporting, as opposed to domestic standards, and
that there is a weakly positive relationship between firm-level corporate governance
mechanisms and stock returns when IFRS are used for financial reporting. From an
economic standpoint, the incremental increase in stock returns related to the interaction
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between the levels of firm-specific corporate governance measures when IFRS is used for
financial reporting is $0.0015.
Results of the full model suggest that EPSit/Pit-1 is significant and for every dollar
increase in earnings, stock returns will increase by $1.13. The earnings variable is not
significant in either the DS or IFRS period, but its significance in the full model suggests
that the difference between periods of the information content provided by the earnings
figure is important to the explanation of stock returns. The interaction between EPSit/Pit-1
and IFRS is negative, -0.017, but not significant. The coefficient on the dollar change in
earnings, scaled by beginning of the year price, however, is not significant to the
explanation of the stock return in all three models.
The coefficient on IFRS indicates that the relationship between the use of IFRS
for financial reporting, as compared to the use of domestic accounting standards, is
negative and significant to the explanation of stock returns. A possible explanation for the
negative relationship could be the losses on stock returns that resulted from the global
financial crises that occurred during the IFRS period are a confounding factor, which is a
topic for future research. A possible second explanation could be that the investor’s
perception of the use of IFRS may be that there is less risk involved as compared to when
DS are used, which could result in less demand for higher returns.
The strength of the legal system is significantly positive in the DS period and
highly significantly positive in the IFRS period. The increase in significance between the
two periods is highly significant and positively related to the firm’s stock return, as
reflected by the results of the full sample, where the coefficient on LAW is positive and
highly significant. The control for the secrecy of the culture is negative and not
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significant in the domestic standards period, which is contrary to what I had expected. It
is positive and marginally significant in the IFRS period, but the coefficient on SECRECY
in the full sample is not significant at any level, which indicates that the difference
between the two periods is not significant. The positive relation between the level of
secrecy of the underlying culture and stock returns is consistent with the data. A possible
explanation could be that investors in firms domiciled in the countries with higher levels
of secrecy demand higher returns on their investments because of the increased risk of
loss when financial reporting is less transparent.
The origin of the country’s legal system was negatively related to stock returns
and marginally significant in the DS period and not significant in the IFRS period. The
difference in the significance of the legal origin between the periods is significant,
however, which suggests that the legal origin of the country offered more information to
explain stock returns before firms transitioned to IFRS for financial reporting. The
negative relationship between legal origin and stock returns could be explained by the
demand of external users for higher returns when there is greater risk and is consistent
with research that has shown that shareholder protection is lower in code law countries,
which would increase the risk of loss to the investor or creditor (La Porta et al. 1998; La
Porta et al. 2000).
The coefficient on the interaction between EPS/Pt-1 and LOSS is negative in all
three models. It is marginally significant in the domestic standards period and significant
in the IFRS period. Its coefficient in the full sample is highly significant, which suggests
that the difference between the two periods is highly significant. The coefficient on the
interaction between ∆EPS/Pt-1 and LOSS is positive and highly significant in IFRS model,
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but negative and not significant in the DS model. The full model results suggest that the
difference in information provided by the interaction between ∆EPS/Pt-1 and LOSS
between the period when DS are used for financial reporting and when IFRS are used is
not statistically different than zero. Unlike the models in the first two papers, SIZE is not
significant in any of the three models.
Robustness Tests
Price Model
Tests run to check for the robustness of the return model are run for the price
model as well. In the benchmark model, which includes both the CG industry index and
the interaction of the index with IFRS, show that IFRS is not significant, the CG variable
is significant at the 0.019 level, and the interaction of the CG variable with IFRS is not
significant. When variables other than ORIGIN are added to the model, the CG industry
index is negative and becomes significant at various levels. When ORIGIN is added, in
any combination, the CG variable is negative and insignificant. A possible interpretation
could be that common law countries traditionally have higher levels of shareholder
protection and one way to increase that protection is to have more effective corporate
governance mechanisms. When external users are more confident that the financial
statements are correct, they do not demand higher returns, which could explain the
negative relationship between price and the corporate governance variables.
As in the return model, there is a limitation because Great Britain firms (firm-year
observations) make up 55.11 (52.13) percent of the sample. The CG variable, alone and
interacted with IFRS, remains insignificant, but the sign changes from negative to
positive. In addition, the interactions between IFRS and BVPS or EPS loose significance
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while the interaction between EPS and SECRECY becomes marginally significant. This
confirms that there is a potential bias in the results and that they are not generalizable to
the general population. Future research could address this challenge by extending the
sample period to include firms from countries that transitioned to IFRS at a later date.
To check for scale related differences, separate regressions are run adding total
assets and the inverse of common shares outstanding to the reported model. The results
are robust and the corporate governance variables remain insignificant.
Return Model
Regressions are run to determine whether the choice of control affected the
significance of the corporate governance index measure. The benchmark model estimated
includes EPS, ∆EPS, IFRS, LOSS, EPS*IFRS, ∆EPS*IFRS, EPS*LOSS, and ∆EPS*LOSS
as independent variables. In this model, neither IFRS nor EPS*IFRS are significant;
∆EPS*IFRS is significant, with a p-value of 0.027. When the CG index and the CG index
interacted with IFRS are added to the model, IFRS becomes marginally significant
(p-value of 0.056) and ∆EPS*IFRS remains significant (p-value of 0.032). Neither of the
variables that include the CG index is significant. This benchmark model is run with
LAW, SECRECY, and ORIGIN added individually and in combination with one other
variable in separate regressions. The only regressions that change the significance of the
CG variables are the estimations with only LAW added and the one with LAW and
SECRECY added. The regression with LAW only shows the CG industry index as
negatively related to returns and significant at the 0.042 level, but the CG industry index
interacted with IFRS is positive and not significant. In the regression that contains both
LAW and SECRECY, the CG variable remains negatively related to returns, although not
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significant, and the interaction with IFRS is positive and significant, with a p-value of
0.039. These results suggest that the strength of the legal system affects the significance
of the CG industry index. The interactions of LAW and the CG index and its interaction
with IFRS were not added to the model to determine their relations because their VIF was
very high, which suggests a challenge with multicolinearity.
A concern for this study is the fact that 60.12 percent of the firms and 56.68
percent of the firm-year observations are from Great Britain. In the full sample, IFRS is
significant, with a p-value of 0.044, but it is insignificant in the robustness test model; the
CG industry index is insignificant in all three models; and the interaction between the CG
index and IFRS is significant at a level of 0.064, but not significant in the model without
Great Britain. These results indicate that there is a potential bias related to the
composition of the sample firms, which could be addressed in future research by being
able to include countries that have transitioned to IFRS during the latter part or after the
sample period. Another possibility would be to obtain additional corporate governance
data.
Two additional regressions are run to determine whether the study’s results are
robust to scale differences. Separate regressions are estimated with total assets and with
the 1/Pt-1 as exogenous variables. The results are generally robust.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of Paper 3 are mixed; the price model shows that, while firm-level
corporate governance measures add value-relevant information to the explanation of the
firm’s stock price, their contribution is not statistically different that zero. In the returns
model, however, there is a marginally-significant positive relation between the stock
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price of the firm and the use of IFRS for financial reporting, as compared to the use of
domestic accounting standards. Thus, H1, which states that there is no relation between
corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level and the use of IFRS for financial
reporting is not rejected for the price model. The marginal significance of the interaction
between the CG variable and IFRS could be considered to reject H1 and suggest that
there is a weak relation between the two, as compared to when domestic standards are
used.
An interesting finding is that the significance of corporate governance is affected
when the legal origin of the country is considered. I interpret this to mean that higher
levels of corporate governance are already in practice for firms in common law countries,
as opposed to civil law countries, and that the differences between the two periods is not
statistically significant.
The lack of significance of the corporate governance mechanisms in the IFRS
period as opposed to the DS periods seems to be at odds with prior research (Ball et al.
2000; Davis-Friday et al. 2006; Habib and Azim 2008). As mentioned earlier, however, a
major limitation of this study is the availability of data for the sample period. When the
price model sample was merged with the corporate governance industry index data, the
number of firms (firm-year observations) fell from 888 (5,180) to 176 (610). The return
model experienced a similar attrition and fell from 843 (4,684) firms (firm-year
observations) to 163 (554) firms (firm-year observations). Both of the remaining reduced
samples are dominated by firms from Great Britain and robustness tests indicate that the
results of this study should be viewed in light of a potential bias and that they are not
generalizable to the general population. Future research could investigate the relation
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between the use of IFRS for financial reporting and the strength of a firm’s corporate
governance mechanisms by extending the sample period in order to include countries that
transitioned to IFRS later than the sample firms for this study. Other possibilities include
obtaining other corporate governance measures to be included in the model.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION AND RESULTS
The globalization of capital markets has allowed firms to list on foreign
exchanges, which changed the needs of external users of financial statements in their
investing and credit decisions by requiring them to be familiar with financial accounting
standards promulgated by different countries. The internal users faced similar challenges
because firms may have subsidiaries domiciled in foreign countries, which are required to
prepare financial statements according that country’s financial accounting standards.
Additional challenges to users of the financial statements were variations in the value
relevance, or transparency, of the accounting information resulting from cross-country
differences among factors such as shareholder protection, legal enforcement, and culture.
To encourage the flow of capital among global markets and to aid both internal and
external users with their management, investment, and credit decisions, a single-set of
high-quality international financial accounting standards was deemed to be desirable
(Barth et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011). Therefore, in 1973, the IASC was formed by ten
nations and charged with the mandate to develop the standards, which were called the
IASs. In April of 2001, the responsibility to develop and enforce the international
accounting standards, IFRS, was passed to the IASB. Today, the broad term of IFRS
refers to the IASs still in use and IFRS, as issued by the IASB. Over 120 firms are
currently requiring or permitting the use of IFRS for financial reporting. Other countries
are planning to transition to the use of IFRS in the future and the SEC is currently
considering whether to adopt or converge US GAAP with IFRS.
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International research has investigated whether the value relevance of the
accounting information has improved with a transition to IFRS and has provided mixed
results, with the general result being there is more value-relevant accounting information
provided when firms use the international standards, as opposed to the domestic
accounting standards for financial reporting (Armstrong et al. 2010; Barth et al. 2008;
Cormier et al. 2009; Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Paananen and Lin 2009). This
dissertation adds to that stream of research by investigating whether, when IFRS is used
for financial reporting, there is a relation between the value relevance of accounting
earnings, book value of equity, and/or change in earnings, in addition to whether there is
incremental value-relevant information provided by cross-country institutional factors,
secrecy of the underlying culture, and/or firm-level corporate governance measures. To
examine these questions, I use the two value relevance models used in prior research,
namely, the price and the return models.
Chapter 2 presents Paper 1, which focused on the value relevance of the relation
of IFRS with accounting information and asks the following research questions: (1) does
the use of IFRS for financial reporting result in changes in the value relevance of a firm’s
accounting information and (2) if there are changes, how are the incremental changes
resulting from the use of IFRS for financial reporting related to the book value of equity
and/ or earnings? Using sample of 888 firms with 5,180 firm-year observations in the
price model and a sample of 843 firms with 4,684 firm-year observations in the return
model, I investigate the two research questions with firms from sixteen countries. The
results are mixed. In both models, the dummy variable added to the equations to indicate
that IFRS were used for financial reporting in that fiscal year is significantly informative.
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When the IFRS dummy was interacted with the accounting information variables in both
models, however, the relation is not statistically significant. In partitioned samples
reflecting the two accounting standards, I did find that the information content of
earnings increased in the IFRS period and that it decreased for book value of earnings.
Neither change, however, was statistically significant. I interpret the results to indicate
that the transition to IFRS resulted in a significant improvement in the information
content, or value relevance, of accounting information, but that the significance was
based on an overall benefit and not significantly related to incremental benefits for the
accounting variables individually.
In Chapter 3, I present Paper 2, which investigates the research question of
whether cross-country institutional factors and culture offer incremental value-relevant
information when IFRS are used for financial reporting, and uses the price and return
samples from Paper 1. Prior research has shown that cross-country factors can affect the
value relevance of accounting information (Ali & Hwang 2000; Bushman and Piotroski
2006; Gray 1988; Hope 2003; Hope et al. 2008; Kang 2003; Lang et al. 2009; La Porta et
al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). A benefit to having a globally-accepted system of
accounting standards may be the lessening of the cross-country effects on financial
reports, which could facilitate the comparison of firms from different countries by
providing more transparent accounting information (Barth et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011).
The results of this study suggest that origin of the county’s legal regime, the strength of
its legal system, and the secrecy of its underlying culture continue to offer incremental
value-relevant information when IFRS are used for financial reporting.
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Paper 3 examines the research question of whether firm-specific corporate
governance mechanisms provide incremental value-relevant information when IFRS are
used for financial reporting and is presented in Chapter 4. The sample for the price
model in this study was composed of 176 firms with 610 firm-year observations from
fourteen countries. The sample for the return model contained 554 firm-year observations
from 163 firms from thirteen countries. The results of the price model suggest the
incremental information provided by firm-level corporate governance measures to
explain the stock price of the firm is not statistically significant from zero. The return
model, on the other hand, showed some statistical significance, but not a highly
significant relation. A possible explanation of the lack of significance between corporate
governance measures and the use of IFRS, which is counter to several prior studies (Ball
et al. 2000; Davis-Friday et al. 2006; Habib and Azim 2008), could be the data limitations
in this study related to the number of firms and firm-year observations lost when the
samples from Papers 1 and 2 were merged with the corporate governance industry index
data.
Taken together, the results of these three studies suggest that the use of IFRS for
financial reporting is related to the value relevance of accounting information to explain
stock price and returns and that the use IFRS offers benefits evidenced by incremental
changes the information contained in the accounting numbers. They also suggest that
when IFRS are used for financial reporting, as opposed to domestic reporting, there
continue be cross-country variations in the incremental value relevance of accounting
information related to the origin of the country’s legal regime, the secrecy of its culture,
and the strength of its legal system. Contrary to my expectations, I did not find the
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significant relation between the value relevance of accounting information when IFRS is
used for financial reporting and firm-specific corporate governance measures. I did find
that the legal origin of the country affects the significance of the corporate governance
measure. Since the samples are dominated by firms from Great Britain and common law
countries traditionally have higher protection for shareholders, one interpretation of the
results of this study could be that there where higher levels of corporate governance
mechanisms in place during the domestic reporting period and that the impact of
transitioning to IFRS did not significantly change the firm’s corporate governance
practices.
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation contributes to international research evaluating the value
relevance of accounting information when firms use international financial reporting
standards, as opposed to domestic accounting standards, for their financial reporting by
providing empirical evidence that there are incremental changes in the value relevance of
accounting information when firms transition to IFRS. It also provides evidence that the
secrecy of a culture, the strength of a country’s legal system, and the legal origin of a
country continue to provide incremental information to the value relevance of accounting
information when IFRS is used for financial reporting. The results of Paper 3, although
not generalizable, may indicate that the transition to IFRS did not result in a need for
stronger corporate governance mechanisms in common law countries, particularly in
Great Britain. This result could be a confirmation that historically common law countries
have had higher levels of shareholder protection in place, regardless of accounting
standard used.
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The results of this study provide information to the external user of the statements
that could enable them to make more informed decisions by suggesting that the crosscountry factors need to be considered in their evaluations of the financial reports.
For standard setters, the results provide empirical evidence that there are changes
in the value relevance of accounting information related to IFRS use, but that areas
remain that allow for cross-country variations in the reporting that could be improved.
Future studies could examine whether, over time, the cross-country variations resulting
from these country-specific factors are minimized or eliminated by a refinement of the
standards and/ or more consistent application and enforcement.
For academics, this study and future studies over time could provide evidence of
whether the goal of the IASB and the IFRC Foundation of developing a single-set of
high-quality global financial accounting standards has been achieved.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several limitations to this study. First, several countries transitioned to
IFRS during 2009 or after. This limited the countries used in this study to those primarily
in the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand. Future studies could extend the
sample period to include the additional countries now reporting according international
accounting standards, which may produce more generalizable results.
Second, in the corporate governance study, data availability in both models
reduced the sample sizes and resulted in samples which are dominated by firms from
Great Britain. This may be contributing to the lack of significance of the corporate
governance measure and the reason why my results run counter to contemporaneous
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research. Future research could include different corporate governance measures, which
should increase the sample size and provide more generalizable results.
Third, the use of the IFRS dummy is a noisy measure for the use of international
accounting standards because not all countries are using the standards as issued by the
IASB. Some of the countries are using versions of IFRS that meet the reporting needs of
their respective country, such as Australia, the European Union, and New Zealand.
Therefore, there remain cross-country differences in the reporting standards. Future
research could develop measures that could take these differences into account.
Fourth, there could be other factors that are contributing to the changes in the
value relevance of accounting information when IFRS are used for financial reporting
other than those examined herein. Some of the factors that could be considered in future
studies are the refinement of the standards over time by the standard setters, the strength
of the enforcement of IFRS reporting by the various standards setters, the development
and enforcement of more consistent auditing standards, and the level of understanding of
the application of IFRS by the preparers of the financial statements.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
Variablea
BVE
BVPS
COUNTRY

CSOS
CSOCB
EPS
∆EPS
IND
INDUSTRY

IFRS

LAW

LEV
NI
ORIGIN

Pt-1
PD

Definition
Source Mnemonic
Total value of common/ordinary equity at fiscal
CGb
ceq
year-end
Book value of equity per share at fiscal year-end,
measured as BVE/CSOS
An indicator variable equal to 1 for the firm’s
CG
loc
country of domicile, and zero otherwise, a control
for differences in economic activity among countries
Common shares outstanding for the stock issue at
CG
cshoi
fiscal year-end, adjusted for capital changes
Common shares outstanding for the stock issue used CG
cshpria
to calculate basic EPS, adjusted for capital changes
Earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items,
CG
measured as [(NI – PREFDIV)/CSOSB]
The dollar change in earnings per share from Yeart-1
to Yeart
Hofstede’s (1980) individualism index score for the
HOFd
country
The firm’s industry classification, based on its twoCG
sic
digit SIC code, a control for differences in accounting
choices across industries
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the financial
WSe w07536
statements are prepared according to IFRS for that
fiscal year, and zero otherwise
The country’s chain-linked summary rating for its
EFWf
Legal System and Property Rights, available in the
EFW 2010Annual Report and based on a scale of 0
to 10 (low to high).The country-year observations
will be classified as having a stronger legal and
enforcement system if the composite score for that
country’s most recent rating is greater than or equal
to the sample median for that year
Measured as total liabilities divided by total assets
Net income, excluding extraordinary items
CG
ib
c
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the country’s
B&LP
legal regime is based on English common law,
and zero otherwise, a proxy for shareholder
Stock price at the end of the fiscal year
CG
prccd
Hofstede’s (1980) power distance index score for
HOF
the country
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PREFDIV
PRICE
RETURN

SECRECY

SIZE
TA
TL
UA

Preferred dividends for the fiscal year
Stock price, measured six months after fiscal
year-end
The annual stock return, measured as the cumulative
percentage change in the firm’s stock return for the
period nine months prior to fiscal year-end through
three months after fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock
splits and dividends
The country’s secrecy score, calculated using
Hofstede’s (1980) values and Gray’s (1988) formula,
measured as [(UA + PD) – IND]. The country will be
classified as having a high level of secrecy if its
secrecy score is greater than or equal to the sample
median
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity at
at fiscal year-end, measured as PRICE*CSHOI
Total assets at fiscal year-end
Total liabilities at fiscal year-end
Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty index score for the
country

____________
a

Source of data in parenthesis

b

Compustat Global

c

Worldscope

d

Barth et al. (2011) and La Porta et al. (1997)

e

Economic Freedom of the World’s 2010 Annual Report

f

Hofstede (1980)

g

Gray (1988)

162

CG
CG

dvp
prccd

CG

HOF &
GRAYg

CG
CG
HOF

at
lt

